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I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
handed down in 1999 by the Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska Court
of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and U.S.
District Court for the District of Alaska.  The summaries focus on
the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or common
law principles interpreted, and the essence of each of the holdings.
Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the information contained
in this review without further reference to the cases cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than the nature of the underlying claims.  The
summaries are presented alphabetically in the following ten areas
of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional,
criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, and torts.
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In White v. State Department of Natural Resources,1 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that the Department of Natural Resources
(“DNR”) violated a lease assignee’s due process rights.2  DNR
ruled that a lease had expired without first granting a hearing when
a factual dispute existed over whether the conditions for automatic
Copyright © 2000 by the Alaska Law Review.  The Year in Review is also
available on the World Wide Web at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/
17ALRYearinReview.
1. 984 P.2d 1122 (Alaska 1999).
2. See id. at 1126.
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extension of the lease had been met.3  White, the assignee, leased
land from the state for oil and gas exploration.4  The lease provided
for automatic term extension if the lessee drilled such that the
“bottom hole location is in the leased area . . . as of the date on
which the lease otherwise would expire . . . .”5  Because there was a
factual dispute between DNR and White over whether this
condition had been met, DNR’s commissioner violated White’s due
process by not granting a hearing.6  The court emphasized that a
hearing would not have been required in the “absence of
substantial and material issues crucial to the determination.”7
In Native Village of Elim v. State,8 the Native Village of Elim
(“Elim”) sued the Board of Fisheries, alleging that the Board was
not sufficiently protecting their interests under the subsistence law.9
Elim believed that a commercial fishery was depleting the supply
of fish on which Elim residents lived, and requested that the Board
intervene.10  The Board had already limited the number of fish that
the commercial interest could take, but refused to further lower
this cap.11  Elim brought suit contesting many of the Board’s
practices.12  The supreme court held that the Board possessed the
requisite experience necessary to set policy for enforcing the
sustained yield clause of the Alaska Constitution13 and the
subsistence law.14  Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion by
rejecting a numerical limit for fisheries in favor of a flexible
standard.15  The court reasoned that the Board was in the best
position to devise a formula that saved time, money, and energy.16
Applying a reasonable basis standard,17 the court held that the
Board also had authority to set geographical scope and type of fish
restrictions in this situation.18
3. See id.
4. See id. at 1124.
5. Id. at 1126.
6. See id. at 1127.
7. Id. at 1126 (quoting NLRB v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821, 826 (4th Cir.
1967)).
8. 990 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1999).
9. See id.
10. See id. at 4.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 1.
13. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
14. See Elim, 990 P.2d at 5; see also ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (LEXIS 1998).
15. See Elim, 990 P.2d at 5.
16. See id. at 7.
17. See id. at 10.
18. See id.
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In Halter v. Department of Commerce and Economic
Development, Medical Board,19 the supreme court held that Alaska
Statutes section 08.64.326(a)(8)(A) was not vague as applied to Dr.
Halter to sanction him for professional incompetence.20  Defendant
filed a complaint against Halter, alleging professional
incompetence based on the statute, because he had not properly
recorded prescriptions for controlled substances on his patients’
charts.21  Halter argued that the statute was vague and violated his
due process rights because it contained no standard of conduct
regarding record keeping.22  The supreme court held that the
statute was not vague as applied to Halter because Alaska case law
does not require the State to promulgate standards to further
define “professional incompetence.”23  The statute sufficiently
warns doctors that if their professional performance does not meet
acceptable levels in the current state of the art, their license may be
revoked.24
In Willis v. State, Department of Revenue, Child Support
Enforcement Division,25 the supreme court held that a Child
Support Enforcement Division (“CSED”) hearing officer failed to
explain adequately her reasons for denying a financial hardship
exemption to lower child support payments and provide relief from
child support arrears.26  The supreme court noted that the CSED
usually is not required to explain a denial of the hardship
exemption if the denial is based on a finding that no hardship
exists.27  The court noted that the denial could have been reached
on any of three different reasons: (1) there was no finding of
hardship with respect to the arrears; (2) the CSED hearing officer
did not believe she had the authority to reduce arrears under the
hardship exemption; or (3) the hearing officer simply did not
consider the issue of reducing arrears.28  However, due to the
unique procedural facts of the case and the ambiguity of the
decision, the supreme court could not determine the basis for the
CSED hearing officer’s decision.29  Moreover, the supreme court
19. 990 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1999).
20. See id. at 1038.
21. See id. at 1036.
22. See id. at 1037.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. 992 P.2d 581 (Alaska 1999).
26. See id. at 588.
27. See id. at 585.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 586.
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stated that the hearing officer had the authority to reduce arrears
retroactively and that there was adequate evidence of past financial
hardship to require consideration of this request.  Therefore, the
supreme court remanded the case to the hearing officer for
determination on the question of a retrospective exemption
covering Willis’s child support debt.30  The supreme court rejected
Willis’s claim that the hearing officer failed to explain adequately
her reasons for refusing to reduce Willis’s ongoing obligations.31
The court reasoned that the exemption is an exception within a
broader rule, Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, and applies only to unusual
cases.32  Therefore, the rule must be sufficiently flexible to be
applied to unique circumstances.33
In Romann v. State, Department of Transportation and Public
Facilities,34 the supreme court held that the Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities (“DOT”) correctly auctioned a
lease to state-owned airport property because there were two
competing applications for the lease.35  A month before Romann’s
twenty-year lease of state-owned airport property expired, he
applied for renewal.36  Before the thirty-day period for public
comment ran, another person applied to lease the property.37  After
determining that both applications met its approval, the DOT
Review Committee decided to sell the lease at public auction.38
Romann argued that Alaska Administrative Code section
40.320(c)(1)’s “first come-first served” rule governed and,
therefore, he should have received the lease when the DOT
Review Committee first approved his application.39  However, the
supreme court noted that a harmonious reading of sections
40.320(c)(1) and 40.320(c)(8)(A) requires that the latter section’s
public auction provision governs when there are conflicting
applications.40  Additionally, failing to require an auction would
defeat the purpose of the notice requirement.41
30. See id. at 589.
31. See id. at 588.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. 991 P.2d 186 (Alaska 1999).
35. See id. at 192.
36. See id. at 188.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 191.
40. See id. at 190.
41. See id.
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In McConell v. Department of Health and Social Services,
Division of Medical Assistance,42 the supreme court held that the
State was not contractually required to provide Dr. McConell with
education pertaining to proper Medicaid billing protocols before it
sanctioned him for improper billing practices.43  Dr. McConell
argued that in a previous incident, the State had agreed in a
settlement to provide education that would have prevented the
instant violations.44  Thus, the State’s failure to do so caused these
most recent violations.45  The supreme court held that the State did
not in fact have a contractual duty to provide the education,
because the settlement on its face did not create such a duty.46  In
fact, the agreement required Dr. McConell to pay for the
education.47  The court further held that the State did not violate
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the
settlement because the State’s conduct did not breach the objective
or subjective components of the covenant.48
In Boyd v. State,49 the supreme court held that an applicant for
a hunting guide license should be permitted to seek a modification
of a suspended imposition of sentence (“SIS”) because he
detrimentally relied on the effect of the SIS regarding his license
renewal.50  Boyd pled no contest to two counts of failing to provide
a licensed assistant guide to non-resident hunters.51  Boyd agreed to
pay $2,500 as part of the SIS.52  While completing his application to
renew his own hunting guide license, the Division of Occupational
Licensing asked whether Boyd had ever been fined more than
$1,000 for a violation of a state hunting or guiding regulation.53  The
Assistant District Attorney assured Boyd that the Division would
not deny Boyd’s application.54  Boyd continued with the application
process on the Assistant District Attorney’s assurance.55
Nonetheless, the Division determined that the $2,500 paid in
42. 991 P.2d 178 (Alaska 1999).
43. See id. at 182.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 183-84.
49. 977 P.2d 113 (Alaska 1999).
50. See id. at 117.
51. See id. at 114.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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connection with the SIS was a fine and denied Boyd’s application.56
The supreme court agreed with the Division’s determination that
the payment was a “fine.”57  In noting that Boyd had relied on the
Assistant District Attorney’s statements rather than seek
modification of the SIS, the supreme court stated that Boyd should
be permitted to seek modification of the SIS to avoid suspension of
his license.58
In Rollins v. State, Department of Revenue,59 the supreme court
held that the Alcohol Beverage Control Board did not err when it
denied Rollins’s fifth annual operating requirement waiver and
application renewal.60  Rollins applied for a liquor license in late
1990 and received a license in 1991.61  Over the next four years,
because of burglaries and compliance problems, she never actually
opened a bar.62  Instead, she applied for and received waivers of the
annual 30-day operating requirement.63  The Board denied her
application for a fifth 30-day annual operating requirement waiver
and her request for renewal of the liquor license.64  The Board
applied 15 Alaska Administrative Code section 104.170, which
allowed the Board to deny a third or subsequent waiver unless the
premises were “condemned or substantially destroyed.”65  The
supreme court upheld the Board’s decision because Alaska
Statutes section 04.11.330 granted broad powers to the Board in
implementing the statute and because the administrative code is
reasonably related to the statute’s purpose of preventing a licensee
from claiming that the premises is under construction year after
year.66
III.  BUSINESS LAW
In Northern Fabrication Co. v. Unocal,67 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that mere economic necessity to settle a contract
dispute was insufficient to establish the coercive act element of a
56. See id. at 115.
57. See id. at 117.
58. See id.
59. 991 P.2d 202 (Alaska 1999).
60. See id. at 206.
61. See id. at 205.
62. See id. at 205-06.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 207.
66. See id. at 207-08.
67. 980 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1999).
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breach of contract test for economic duress.68  Northern Fabrication
Company (“NFC”) exceeded his budget in fulfilling a construction
contract with Unocal, and Unocal offered to pay half of the
overrun.69  NFC accepted and signed a general release.70  NFC then
sued, alleging that because it faced bankruptcy and needed the
income from the settlement, it had been coerced into settling.71
The supreme court noted that because economic necessity is often
the reason for compromise, imminent bankruptcy is not enough to
satisfy the economic duress requirement that Unocal committed a
coercive act.72  The court distinguished Totem Marine Tug & Barge,
Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,73 a key economic duress case.
In the present case, Unocal did not place NFC in dire economic
straits; by contrast, in Totem, the Unocal “deliberately withheld
payment of an acknowledged debt.”74
In Oliver v. Sealaska Corp.,75 the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court was correct in dismissing Oliver’s case without
prejudice because the federal statutes under which Oliver was
attempting to sue do not create a private cause of action.76  Oliver is
a native Alaskan and owns shares in two regional corporations
organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(“ANCSA”).77  Oliver’s class action claim, which was directed at all
twelve regional corporations, contended that ANCSA § 7(i)78
deprives him and other shareholders of their proper revenue
sharing.79  Both the Ninth Circuit and the district court agreed that
there are no provisions in ANCSA or Alaska corporate law that
provide Oliver with a private cause of action.80  Both courts
recognized that Oliver had a derivative claim under Alaska law,81
but Oliver refused to amend his complaint.82
68. See id. at 961.
69. See id. at 960.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 961.
73. 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978).
74. Northern Fabrication Co., 980 P.2d at 961.
75. 192 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1999).
76. See id. at 1222.
77. See id. at 1223; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629f (1994).
78. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (1994).
79. See Oliver, 192 F.3d at 1223.
80. See id. at 1222.
81. See id. at 1225.
82. See id. at 1223.
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In Gossman v. Greatland Directional Drilling, Inc.,83 the
supreme court held that corporate survival statutes permitted suits
against dissolved corporations for actions accruing after
dissolution.84  The court reinstated the cause of action of Gossman,
who had brought a negligence suit against Greatland Directional
Drilling, Inc. after Gossman was injured at Greatland’s storage
facility.85  Greatland had voluntarily dissolved itself prior to
Gossman’s accident.86  The court held that the corporate survival
statute did not impose any statute of limitations on such actions.87
The court declared that it is a legislative policy to permit a
dissolved corporation to exist for an indefinite period of time
during which it may be sued for actions, regardless of when such
actions arose.88
In Hayes v. Bering Sea Reindeer Products,89 the supreme court
held that a partner is bound by a default judgment entered against
the partnership, even if that partner did not take part in the
litigation.90  Bering Sea Reindeer Products sued the partnership
and two partners individually for breach of contract when the
partners defaulted on a purchase contract.91  Hayes’s partner failed
to defend the partnership, and a default judgment was entered
against the partnership and Hayes’s partner.92  Hayes did not
himself participate, so he obtained a continuance to contest the
claims against him personally.93  The supreme court held that
Hayes’s non-participation in the litigation was irrelevant, since his
status as a partner made him jointly and severally liable for the
default judgment against the partnership.94  Since Hayes did not
contest his status as a partner, he remained liable for the default
judgment.95  The supreme court then dismissed Hayes’s
counterclaims against Bering Sea for breach of contract and
express warranties as meritless.96
83. 973 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1999).
84. See id. at 94.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 98.
88. See id. at 99.
89. 983 P.2d 1280 (Alaska 1999).
90. See id. at 1283.
91. See id. at 1282.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 1283.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 1284.
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In Alaska Southern Partners v. Prosser,97 the supreme court
held that an undocumented agreement, where the creditor had
accepted an unconventional form of payment as satisfying the loan
in full, satisfied the “no asset” exception to 12 U.S.C. § 1823.98  A
representative, acting on behalf of the bank, accepted Huffman
Hills Development Company’s (“HHDC”) proposal to convey five
notes to satisfy a loan.99  Despite the agreement, the bank credited
the debtor only for four notes and indicated in the loan file that
$362,000 remained due for the fifth note.100  The bank later received
$294,861.43 for the fifth note and sent a letter to HHDC confirming
that the loan would “be considered satisfied in full.”101  Two days
later, the bank failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) was appointed as its receiver.102  Alaska
Southern Partners then purchased the note, determined by the
FDIC to be $77,179 plus interest, and sued HHDC for payment.103
The supreme court concluded that because the bank had accepted
the payment of the fifth note as satisfying the loan in full, the FDIC
acquired no asset and, thus, section 1823 did not apply.104
In Briggs v. Newton,105 a business owner, Hess, entered into a
fixed-price contract with a first contractor, Shea, to remodel his
business premises.106  After the first week of work, Hess refused to
pay a bill that exceeded the flat rate he had expected.107
Consequently, Shea discontinued the remodeling work, and Hess
hired a second contractor, Christensen, to complete the work.108
Christensen made disparaging comments to Hess about the quality
of Shea’s work and speculated that the unexpected price increase
was part of Shea’s plan to induce Hess to contract with him, and
then force him to pay higher prices once work had begun.109  While
97. 972 P.2d 161 (Alaska 1999).
98. See id. at 166.  (providing that when the loan asset had been discharged by
the payment and cancellation of the underlying debt before the FDIC obtained
the assets of the bank, a rebuttable presumption arises in favor of the paying
party, and the FDIC must come forward with evidence to prove that the note has
not been paid in full.)
99. See id.
100. See id. at 163.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 165-66.
105. 984 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1999).
106. See id. at 1115.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1119.
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Hess and Shea were suing each other in district court for breach of
contract, Shea’s co-contractor from the initial project declared
bankruptcy and listed the lawsuit as an asset.110  The supreme court
held that: (1) only the bankruptcy estate, and not Shea’s co-
contractor, had standing to sue to enforce Shea’s former interests,
(2) the fact that Shea breached the contract blocked his claim that
Christensen later interfered with Shea’s contract with Hess, and (3)
Christensen’s comments about Shea were defamatory but
privileged. 111  On the first holding, the court reasoned that when a
“debtor’s assets include causes of action, the bankruptcy trustee
becomes the proper plaintiff to pursue those claims; only the
trustee has standing to pursue causes of action that now belong to
the estate.”112  The breach claim was collaterally estopped because
breach requires intentional interference with the contract.113  Since
Christensen made the defamatory statements after Shea had
breached the contract, there was no contract to interfere with when
he made the statements.114  A court could find that Christensen’s
comments were defamatory because they tended to lower Shea’s
reputation in the community and deter third parties from dealing
with him.115  However, they were shielded from suit by the business
privilege existing when a statement is made to protect a lawful
business interest.116
In Thompson v. United Parcel Service,117 the supreme court
held that the Worker’s Compensation Board should have applied
the statutory definition of “spendable weekly wage,” because the
employer did not present substantial evidence to justify a deviation
from the statute governing temporary total disability benefits.118
Thompson, an employee of United Parcel Service (“UPS”), injured
her knee at work.119  Because UPS classified Thompson as a part-
time employee, the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board issued
her a lower disability award than the statutory formula required.120
Thompson filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim, based on
the work she did in a previous full-time position, in an effort to
110. See id. at 1117.
111. See id. at 1116.
112. Id. at 1118.
113. See id. at 1119.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1120 (citing French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 32 (Alaska 1996)).
116. See id.
117. 975 P.2d 684 (Alaska 1999).
118. See id. at 691.
119. See id. at 684.
120. See id.
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increase her benefits.121  The supreme court remanded to the Board
to award Thompson compensation calculated under the formula in
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.220(a)(1), as well as reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.122
In Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough,123 the borough
contracted with Philbin to pave its roads with gravel.124  Winter set
in before Philbin could complete the job, and Philbin attempted to
negotiate a “winter shutdown” so that he could resume work in the
spring.125  The borough terminated the project for nonperformance,
and compelled Philbin to sign a release from the contract.126  The
supreme court found that the issue of whether the release
foreclosed Philbin’s action for breach of contract was a genuine of
issue of fact, and not fit for summary judgment.127  Alaska law
affords two tests concerning the enforceability of a release
document.128  A court looks either to the parties’ intentions or to
the aggrieved party’s understanding of the release.129  Here, under
either test, a question of material fact existed that warranted a
trial.130  Further, a trial was necessary to determine whether
Alaska’s codification of section 1-107 of the Uniform Commercial
Code applied.131  That provision indicates that a claim arising from
an alleged breach can be discharged, but the release must be signed
after the breach.132  In this case, there was a factual dispute
regarding whether the release was signed before or after the
breach.133  Finally, the supreme court rejected the borough’s
contention that the parol evidence rule mandated integration of the
release into the contract.134  The rule does not apply when the
contract is formed as the result of mistake or misunderstanding,
and Philbin permissibly used external evidence to show mistake.135
121. See id. at 685.
122. See id.
123. 991 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1999).
124. See id. at 1264.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 1265.
127. See id. at 1270.
128. See id. at 1266.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 1269 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.107 (LEXIS 2000)).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 1270.
135. See id.
YIR.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:17 AM
2000] YEAR IN REVIEW 173
In International Investors v. Business Park Fund,136 the
supreme court held that Business Park Fund’s (“BPF”) limited
partners were liable to BPF’s unpaid creditors for their obligations
to BPF, which included their unpaid contributions.137  BPF, a
limited partnership, defaulted on a note payable to International
Investors (“II”).138  II sued BPF’s limited partners, and the superior
court released BPF from all liability.139  The supreme court
reversed, finding the limited partners liable for their contribution
to the partnership because the limited partners’ unpaid capital
contributions were enforceable by a partnership creditor.140  Under
Alaska law, limited partners are not liable for the obligations of the
partnership, but they are liable to partnership creditors to the
extent they do not pay promised capital contributions.141  Further,
although a six-year statute of limitations would have barred a claim
by BPF for unpaid contributions from the limited partners, II was
not similarly barred from its claim.142  The limited partners’
defenses, if the claim had been brought by BPF, were not available
against II.143
IV.  CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
In Noey v. Bledsoe,144 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
client disputing attorney’s fees waives his right to binding
arbitration when he fails to timely request arbitration, or he
commences or maintains a legal action to settle the dispute.145
Noey petitioned for arbitration three weeks before his trial date
and nearly eighteen months after the complaining attorney,
Bledsoe, initially informed him of his right to arbitration.146
Bledsoe claimed that his petition for arbitration was timely because
the complaining co-counsel, Davis, filed an interpleader action
concerning funds in his possession which both Noey and Bledsoe
136. 991 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1999).
137. See id. at 221.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 223.
141. See id. at 224 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 32.10.160(c) (LEXIS 2000)).
142. See id. at 225.
143. See id.
144. 978 P.2d 1264 (Alaska 1999).
145. See id. at 1269.
146. See id. at 1268.
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claimed.147  Rejecting Noey’s argument, the supreme court held that
Bledsoe violated Alaska Bar Rule 39(a), which requires attorneys
who are recovering fees from clients to serve their clients with
written notice of the client’s right to binding arbitration at the time
of service of a summons in the civil action.148  In so holding, the
court interpreted Rule 39(a) to include any action to recover fees
from a client, regardless of which attorney files the action.149
Moreover, the court noted that Noey participated in the
interpleader action by answering Davis’s complaint.150  The court
also refused to be lenient with Noey on the ground that he was a
pro se litigant because Bledsoe provided him with multiple notices
of his right to arbitration.151
In North Slope Borough v. Green International, Inc.,152 the
supreme court held that the superior court used an incorrect
standard in denying defendant’s costs and attorney’s fees.153
Instead of granting a motion for a change in venue from
Anchorage to Barrow, the Anchorage superior court dismissed
North Slope Borough’s (“NSB’s”) case without prejudice provided
the case were refiled within fifteen days in Barrow.154  After refiling
in Barrow, NSB filed a motion requesting costs and attorney’s fees
associated with litigating the venue issue.155  Green International
opposed the motion and asked for costs and fees associated with
fighting NSB’s motion for costs.156  The superior court denied both
motions, stating that the issues could be resolved at the conclusion
of the action.157  The supreme court, without analyzing whether the
dismissal without prejudice by the Anchorage court was the proper
procedure, concluded that the dismissal without prejudice did not
amount to a de facto change in venue.158  Therefore, the motions for
defendant’s costs and attorney’s fees  could not be combined with
the Barrow appeal and must be litigated separately.159
147. See id. at 1269.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 1269-70.
152. 969 P.2d 1161 (Alaska 1999).
153. See id. at 1164.
154. See id. at 1162.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 1164.
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In Strong Enterprises, Inc. v. Seaward,160 the supreme court
held that the superior court correctly awarded attorney’s fees to
Seaward at the thirty percent level because it was a non-monetary
judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2), but that Seaward was
not entitled to receive accountancy fees incurred prior to judgment
based on Civil Rule 79(b) or Administrative Rule 7(c).161  Strong
argued that requiring it to pay Seaward’s portion of the partnership
profits and interests meets the definition for a money judgment;
accordingly, the court should apply the attorney’s fees schedule
contained in Civil Rule 82(b)(1).162  The supreme court disagreed,
reasoning that the final judgment required Seaward’s former
partners to perform accountings and pay Seaward for his interest,
but the judgment did not specify the amounts to be paid and was,
therefore, self-executing.163  However, the supreme court held that
the superior court had abused its discretion by granting
accountancy fees that occurred prior to the judgment.164  According
to the supreme court, it “would be anomalous to deny full
preparation costs for expert witnesses who testify under
Administrative Rule 7(c), but to award full costs under Civil Rule
79(b) for expert consultants who do not testify on the theory
Administrative Rule 7(c) does not apply.”165
In City of Kodiak v. Parish,166 the supreme court upheld the
superior court’s decision that Columbia Cascade Company
(“CCC”) was entitled to recover costs and attorney’s fees against
the City of Kodiak.167  A child had been injured on playground
equipment produced by CCC and maintained by the City of
Kodiak.168 Parish, the child’s mother, sued the city, which then filed
a third-party complaint against CCC, seeking equitable
apportionment for its damages.169
Kodiak argued on appeal that the trial court misinterpreted
the state rules of civil procedure addressing the allocation of costs
and attorney’s fees in situations concerning third-party plaintiffs
and third-party defendants.170  The issue was whether Parish
160. 980 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1999).
161. See id. at 457.
162. See id. at 458.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 459-60.
166. 986 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1999).
167. See id. at 204.
168. See id. at 201.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 202.
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asserted a direct claim against third-party defendant CCC.171  The
court concluded that Parish did, in fact, assert such a claim and
thus, Civil Rule 82(e), which applies only when a plaintiff does not
assert a direct claim against a third-party defendant, does not
apply.172  Since Rule 79(h) is nearly identical in language and intent
to Rule 82(e), it’s interpretation must be consistent with Rule
82(e).173  Thus, since Rule 82(e) doesn’t apply with respect to
attorneys fees, Rule 79(h) must not apply with respect to costs.174
B. Damages
In Nelson v. Progressive Corp.,175 the supreme court upheld the
jury’s award of damages.176  The court concluded that the trial court
did not err in denying a new trial on the question of damages
because Nelson neither raised an inconsistent verdict argument nor
sought resubmission before the jury was discharged.177  Nelson,
therefore, waived his right to a new trial on the damages
question.178  Furthermore, the jury’s decision to award
compensatory damages and refusal to award punitive damages
were not inconsistent.179  The jury could have found that
Progressive’s misrepresentations during an arbitration were made
knowingly, but not with reckless indifference to Nelson’s rights.180
In International Brotherhood of Electric Workers Local 1547 v.
Alaska Utility Construction, Inc.,181 the supreme court affirmed the
trial court’s decision to deny a new trial on the condition that
Alaska Utility Construction (“AUC”) accept a remittitur.182  The
supreme court also applied a modified Donovan rule and permitted
AUC to appeal the trial court’s remittitur.183  The case arose from
several incidents where members of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers (“IBEW”) picketed at the work sites of
171. See id.
172. See id. at 204.
173. See id. at 203.
174. See id.
175. 976 P.2d 859 (Alaska 1999).
176. See id. at 869.
177. See id. at 864.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 865.
181. 976 P.2d 852 (Alaska 1999).
182. See id. at 859.
183. See id. at 858 (citing Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977)
(barring plaintiffs from challenging on appeal the amount of a remitted award
when they accept the trial court’s remittitur.)).
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AUC.184  During the picketing, IBEW members threatened to kill
AUC workers and rape their daughters, threw and kicked stones at
AUC workers, vandalized work performed by AUC, and
prevented AUC from completing work.185  After trial, the trial
court denied IBEW’s motion for a new trial on the condition that
AUC accept a remittitur that reduced punitive damages from
$425,000 to $212,500.186  The trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the new trial because there was ample evidence to
support a jury determination of outrageous conduct.187
In allowing AUC to appeal the remittitur, the supreme court
applied a modified Donovan rule because the benefits a party
receives in accepting a remittitur (avoiding delay, reducing
uncertainty of outcome, and reducing litigation costs) are negated
when the opposing party raises the issue on appeal.188  Nonetheless,
the supreme court was not “left with the definite and firm
conviction that the [trial] judge made a mistake in granting the
remittitur,”189 because the trial court carefully applied the balancing
test for evaluating when a remittitur is necessary.190  The supreme
court then rejected IBEW’s arguments that punitive damages of
$212,500 was still excessive, noting the flagrant behavior of IBEW
members and the fact that the Local’s insurer paid it $220,000 to
settle its liability.191
In McCubbins v. State,192 the supreme court held that the trial
court abused its discretion by not ordering a new trial on the issue
of damages when the jury award was internally inconsistent.193
McCubbins dove into the water in a roped-off swimming area
maintained by the state and hit his head on a submerged rock.194
The jury awarded McCubbins damages for future medical
expenses, but failed to award any damages for loss of future
earning capacity.195  The supreme court had held that it would not
disturb a jury verdict if a logical theory existed to reconcile any
184. See id. at 854.
185. See id. at 854-55.
186. See id. at 858.
187. See id.
188. See id. (citing Plesko v. City of Milwaukee, 120 N.W.2d 130 (Wis. 1963)).
189. Id. at 857.
190. See id. at 858 (applying the test set forth in Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,
594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979)).
191. See id. at 859.
192. 984 P.2d 501 (Alaska 1999).
193. See id. at 509.
194. See id. at 502.
195. See id. at 503.
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apparent inconsistencies.196  In this case, however, the court found
that no logical theory existed for the jury award.197
C. Miscellaneous
In Renwick v. State,198 the supreme court held that claims in a
declaratory judgment action were not barred by res judicata or
issue preclusion if the superior court did not consider those claims
in a separate ruling and the party asserting the claims did not, but
could have, raised those questions on the appeal of the other
action.199  Renwick brought two separate claims in superior court:
the first was a declaratory judgment action to determine certain
questions of law, and the second was an appeal from an Alaska
Board of Marine Pilots’ ruling to suspend his marine pilot’s
license.200  The court heard arguments for the declaratory judgment
action during Renwick’s other suit, the appeal of the Board’s
decision.201  The superior court ultimately found an issue not
presented in the declaratory judgment action to be determinative
in the Board decision.202  During the appeal of the superior court’s
ruling, Renwick failed to raise three questions that the superior
court did not consider.203  The superior court subsequently granted
the State’s motion to dismiss Renwick’s declaratory judgment
action on the ground of res judicata.204  The superior court granted
the motion to dismiss and Renwick appealed.205  The supreme court
stated that res judicata would not prevent a party from raising
claims in a later action if the party failed to raise those claims as
alternate grounds in a previous action.206  Those same claims were
not barred by issue preclusion because the issues were not decided,
were not resolved by a final judgment on the merits, and were not
essential to the final judgment in the first action.207  The court then
affirmed the dismissal of the case on the grounds that Renwick
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but modified that the
196. See id. at 506.
197. See id.
198. 971 P.2d 631 (Alaska 1999).
199. See id. at 634.
200. See id. at 632.
201. See id. at 633.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 634.
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dismissal be without prejudice in order to permit Renwick to argue
those claims later.208
In Cramer v. Wade,209 Alaska resident Wade loaned $135,000
to a California business venture (“TSO”) on a note guaranteed by
Cramer’s corporation (“Kokua”).210  Kokua was a Nevada
corporation, and Cramer was a California citizen.211  When the
business venture failed to repay the loan, Wade sued Cramer and
several others who were not party to the appeal.212  Cramer moved
under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(4) to set aside the resulting default
judgment against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.213  The court
first reasoned that Cramer established sufficient minimum contacts
to satisfy the due process requirements for personal jurisdiction
because he actively solicited a loan from an Alaska resident.214  The
court also cited the rule that due process requirements are met
when an out-of-state party receives funds from an Alaska
resident.215  The court rejected Cramer’s arguments that his actions
were outside Alaska’s long-arm statute.216  The statute defines the
minimum reach of personal jurisdiction, and is supplemented by
any case “in which exercise is permissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”217  Personal jurisdiction is not barred by the
Fourteenth Amendment because minimum contacts existed, and
maintenance of the suit fits with traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.218  Agreeing to guarantee a loan satisfies the
United States Supreme Court’s minimum contacts requirement
that Cramer must reasonably anticipate suit in Alaska by
“‘purposefully direct[ing]” his efforts at an Alaska resident.219  The
corporate shield doctrine did not protect Cramer because he was
one of Kokua’s only shareholders, and Kokua was not in the
business of guaranteeing loans.220
208. See id. at 635.
209. 985 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1999).
210. See id. at 469.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 470 (this rule allows the courts to set aside any judgment that is
void, for instance, in this case, for lack of personal jurisdiction).
214. See id.
215. See id. (citing Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of
Fairbanks, 685 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Alaska 1984)).
216. See id. at 471; ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (Michie 1998).
217. Cramer, 985 P.2d at 471 (citing Kennecorp, 685 P.2d at 1299).
218. See id.
219. See id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
220. See id. at 472 (noting that this doctrine protects corporate officers from
personal jurisdiction only when they are acting in corporate capacity).
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In Peter v. Progressive Corporation,221 the supreme court
articulated the factors to be considered by a trial court
contemplating appointment of a discovery master.222  Peter sued
Progressive, an insurance company, on behalf of his son, alleging
bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty in denying knowledge that a
driver who had hit Peter’s son while he was crossing the street was
a policyholder.223  After receiving extensive discovery requests, the
trial court granted Progressive’s motion requesting appointment of
a discovery master, and assessed the master’s fees to the losing
party in each disputed matter.224
The supreme court acknowledged that trial courts have a
general power to appoint discovery masters under Alaska Civil
Rule 53(a) and established the circumstances when a special master
would be appropriate: “(1) where the issues are universally
complex or specialized; (2) where discovery is particularly
document intensive; (3) where resolving discovery disputes will be
especially time consuming; (4) where the parties are particularly
contentious or obstructionist; or (5) where a master will facilitate a
more speedy and economical determination of the case.”225
Furthermore, the court stated that apportionment of the master’s
fees should be determined by the trial court after considering,
among other things, the financial means and trial conduct of the
parties and the effect a master would have on the speediness and
cost of the trial.226
In Baypack Fisheries, L.L.C. v. Nelbro Packing Co.,227 the
supreme court held that a Washington packing company
(“Nelbro”) had not sufficiently proven that Alaska was a grossly
inconvenient forum in which to litigate against an Alaska fishery
(“Baypack”) to merit transfer under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.228  To obtain a grant of forum non conveniens, the
movant must show that the forum is “seriously inconvenient.”229
The plaintiff’s choice of forum is disturbed only when public and
private interests weigh strongly in favor of dismissal.230  The
following five factors are relevant to proving forum non
221. 986 P.2d 865 (Alaska 1999).
222. See id. at 870-72.
223. See id. at 867.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 870.
226. See id. at 872.
227. 992 P.2d 1116 (Alaska 1999).
228. See id. at 1120.
229. Id. at 1119.
230. See id.
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conveniens: (1) ease of access of proof; (2) availability and cost of
finding witnesses; (3) level of harassment inherent to defending in
the inconvenient forum; (4) enforceability of the judgment; and  (5)
burden on the community in litigating matters not of public
concern.231  Nelbro could show only that the ease of access to proof
and the availability and cost of finding witnesses would be more
inconvenient in Alaska.232  However, even these factors were
largely mooted because extensive discovery had already been
completed.233  Thus, the court reversed the dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds.234
In Marathon Oil Co. v. Arco Alaska, Inc.,235 the supreme court
held that arbitrators were not unreasonable in determining they
could revise a finding of liability, nor did they commit gross error in
refusing to grant a hearing on the question of their authority to
make such a revision.236  The arbitrators had split the proceedings
into two hearings for the convenience of the parties.237  Then, in the
second hearing, the arbitrators revised a decision made in the prior
hearing.238  Applying a “reasonably possible” standard, the supreme
court concluded that the arbitrators were not unreasonable in
revising the decision because the determinations of the first hearing
were related to the determinations of the second hearing.239  The
court also upheld the arbitrators’ decision not to grant Marathon a
hearing on the arbitrators’ authority to revise determinations of
liability.240  The arbitrators did not commit gross error because the
arbitration agreement granted them “considerable leeway in
matters of procedure,” and because they reasonably concluded that
the parties should have known the liability decision was not
binding.241
In Andrus v. Lena,242 the supreme court held that Lena, the
plaintiff in a personal injury action against Andrus, was not entitled
to an award of increased prejudgment interest.243  Since the
231. See id. (citing Crowson v. Sealaska Corp., 705 P.2d 905, 907-08 (Alaska
1985)).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 1120.
234. See id.
235. 972 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1999).
236. See id. at 602-03.
237. See id. at 602.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 603.
242. 975 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1999).
243. See id. at 57.
YIR.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:17 AM
182 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [17:1
prejudgment offer rejected by Andrus was not more favorable than
the jury award, the superior court erred in applying an interest
penalty pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 68.244  The supreme court
examined the formula for determining whether a prejudgment
settlement offer was more favorable to the offeree than the final
judgment, and the court held that this formula requires the
addition of prejudgment interest only on the portion of the jury’s
award covering past damages.245
In In the Matter of S.H.,246 the supreme court upheld a
conservator’s appointment to, and settlement of, S.H.’s case.247
S.H. sued his former employer for sadistically and physically
mistreating him.248  During the suit, “S.H. displayed various indicia
of instability, including irrational behavior, paranoia, inclinations
toward gratuitous dismissal of his personal injury suit, a tendency
to threaten his own witnesses, the desire to initiate direct and
inappropriate dealings with opposition counsel and the judge, and
a marked lack of confidentiality.”249  All but one of the psychiatric
experts that examined S.H. agreed that a mental impairment
caused S.H. to act irrationally at times.250  After S.H. refused to
settle the case for $500,000 and made unfounded accusations
against the lawyers and judges, S.H.’s attorneys filed a Petition for
Appointment of Limited Conservator/Guardian Ad Litem of a
Person.251  The trial court appointed a conservator who ultimately
settled the case for $500,000.252
The supreme court rejected S.H.’s assertion that the
conservator lacked the power to settle his claim, because
conservators are specifically granted such power under Alaska
Statutes section 13.26.280(c)(19).253  The court also rejected S.H.’s
argument that the trial court applied the wrong standard in
appointing a conservator.  The court reasoned that any error was
harmless because Alaska Statutes section 13.26.165(b) would
authorize the judge to appoint a conservator if S.H.’s property
244. See id. at 58.  The lower court awarded Lena an enhanced attorney’s fee
award due to a mistaken assumption that Andrus had rejected an offer of
judgment more favorable than the judgment.
245. See id. at 57-58.
246. 987 P.2d 735 (Alaska 1999).
247. See id. at 739-41.
248. See id. at 737.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 737-38.
251. See id. at 738.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 739.
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interest in the personal injury suit could have been wasted by his
own management of the suit.254  The court then rejected S.H.’s
argument that the trial court must find the person unable to make
rational decisions in general.255  Rather, a conservator may be
appointed to address the individual’s specific incapacity to protect
the individual’s property.256  The supreme court also held that the
conservator’s settling of S.H.’s case did not violate S.H.’s jury trial
rights.257  The court noted that a conservator must have such
authority, otherwise the ward, already deemed incapable by a
court, could always regain control of the case by demanding a jury
trial.258
In Red Top Mining, Inc. v. Anthony,259 the supreme court held
that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Red
Top’s motion to intervene by right in a trial that had ended eight
months earlier.260  Anthony had been president of Red Top and
transferred title of a mining claim to himself for debts allegedly
owed to him by Red Top.261  Anthony then filed suit against Red
Top’s predecessors in interest to quiet any claims they may have
had against the mining claim.262  Red Top was not named in
Anthony’s complaint and did not participate in the April 1996
trial.263  In December 1996, eight months after the trial and three
months after the court had entered its decision in favor of
Anthony, Red Top filed an answer to Anthony’s original
complaint; Red Top later filed a motion to intervene by right.264
The supreme court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Red Top’s untimely motion to
intervene.265  The court also noted that two of Red Top’s
shareholders knew of the trial as early as 1994 because they had
signed affidavits in connection with the original litigation.266
In West v. Buchanan,267 the supreme court held that
defendant’s peremptory challenge request under Alaska Civil Rule
254. See id.
255. See id. at 740.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 741.
258. See id.
259. 983 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1999).
260. See id. at 746.
261. See id. at 744.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 745.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 746.
266. See id. at 747.
267. 981 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1999).
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42(c)(3), for a change of judge in a vehicle accident case was
timely.268  The court, thus, affirmed the lower court’s decision to
allow the defendant, Buchanan, to peremptorily challenge the
lower court judge.269  Due to Buchanan’s filing of a Notice of
Change of Judge, the case was reassigned from Judge Beistline to
Judge Steinkruger.270  Judge Steinkruger granted Buchanan
summary judgment and determined that West’s amended
complaint, which had included Buchanan as a defendant, did not
encompass the date of the original complaint.271  West appealed
from this decision.272
The supreme court held that one trial court may overrule
another “in the proper exercise of judicial discretion.”273  The court
noted that “Judge Steinkruger was within her discretion to
reconsider whether West’s amended complaint would properly
relate back to the date her complaint was originally filed.”274
However, the amendment substituting Buchanan as the driver
would properly relate back to the date the complaint was filed, thus
falling within the statute of limitations.275  Applying Rule 15 (c),276
the supreme court concluded that “West proved that Buchanan
received notice of the institution of the action and knew or should
have known before expiration of the period for commencement of
the action that [he] was the proper party in the suit.”277
In Compton v. Chatanika Gold Camp Properties,278 the
supreme court held that the superior court’s dismissal of legal
malpractice claims against the debtor’s estate violated the
automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) because the claims
were part of the bankruptcy estate and the dismissal was without
the trustee’s permission.279  A creditor purchased litigation claims
from the defendant-debtor; the creditor then filed a malpractice
suit against the debtor’s attorney.280  The bankruptcy court set aside
the order approving sale of the claims, and ruled that the trustee
268. See id. at 1066.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 1065.
272. See id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1066.
275. See id. at 1067.
276. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 15(c).
277. Id.
278. 988 P.2d 598 (Alaska 1999).
279. See id. at 599.
280. See id.
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was the real party in interest in the claims.281  When the creditor
and debtor agreed to dismiss the claims, plaintiff trustee attempted
to substitute himself as the real party in interest.282  The supreme
court overruled the superior court’s dismissal of the claims because
the claims were property of the estate and, as such, were subject to
the trustee’s control and the automatic stay provision.283
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Due Process
In Church v. State,284 the Alaska Supreme Court held that it
was not improper for the Permanent Fund Dividend Division to
deny Church a 1993 Permanent Fund Dividend because he was
absent from Alaska for more than 180 days in 1992.285  Church left
the state for 274 days to care for his dying mother, which was not
one of the allowable absences enumerated in Alaska Statutes
section 43.23.095(8) (A)-(G) or 15 Alaska Administrative Code
23.163(c).286  The court held that strict adherence to the statute was
not unreasonable, given that the purpose of section 43.23.095(8)
was to ensure that dividends are given only to permanent
residents.287  Moreover, to ease the administrative burden of
determining eligibility, discretionary review for absences not
specifically excused is limited to absences of 180 days or less.288
Further, even though the recently enacted subsections
43.23.095(8)(H) and (I) allow absences to care for ailing relatives,
the new subsections did not apply to Church because they were not
effective until 1997.289  Church was not denied due process because
there is only a right to an evidentiary hearing in the face of a
factual dispute.290  Finally, Church’s rights to travel and to family
relationships were not infringed because the State’s purpose in
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 603.
284. 973 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1999).
285. See id. at 1127.
286. See id.; ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8)(A)-(G) (LEXIS 1998); 15 AAC
23.163(c) (LEXIS 1997).
287. See Church, 973 P.2d at 1129; ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(h) (LEXIS 1998).
288. See Church, 973 P.2d at 1129.
289. See id.
290. See id.; ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(H)-(I) (LEXIS 1998).
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awarding dividends only to residents outweighed Church’s right to
reside outside Alaska.291
In Nickerson v. University of Alaska, Anchorage,292 the
supreme court held that due process under both the United States
and Alaska Constitutions prevented a university from dismissing a
student until providing him with adequate notice of the deficiency
in his work and informing him that continued deficiency would
result in dismissal.293  Additionally, the supreme court noted that
although dismissal for academic reasons required less procedural
protection than dismissal for disciplinary reasons, the notice given
to students must precede dismissal by a reasonable time to allow
the student to cure his or her deficiency.294  Nickerson was
dismissed from a teaching practicum and the special education
program because he had problems with the teachers.295  Noting that
the ability of teachers to “interact effectively with their students
and colleagues” is a necessary skill for teachers, the supreme court
accepted the university’s characterization of the dismissal as
academic, despite the fact that it was premised largely upon
Nickerson’s conduct.296 Because the record was unclear as to
whether Nickerson received adequate notice of his pending
dismissal, the supreme court remanded the case for further
findings.297
In Hoople v. State,298 the court of appeals held that “Alaska’s
felony DWI statute did not require proof that the defendant acted
with any culpable mental state regarding his prior misdemeanor
DWI convictions.”299  Further, the court held that the DWI statute
did not violate the due process guarantees of the federal and state
constitutions.300  Hoople had been convicted of misdemeanor DWI
at least two times within the five years prior to this DWI
conviction, which raised this third conviction to a class C felony.301
Hoople argued that the increase from a misdemeanor to a class C
felony violated her constitutional due process rights because the
291. See Church, 973 P.2d at 1131 (citing Alaska Dep’t. of Revenue, 900 P.2d
728, 734 (Alaska 1995)).
292. 975 P.2d 46 (Alaska 1999).
293. See id. at 53.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 48-49.
296. Id. at 53.
297. See id. at 54.
298. 985 P.2d 1004 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
299. Id. at 1006.
300. See id.
301. See id. at 1005.
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increase required no proof of a culpable mental state regarding the
aggravating circumstances.302  The court rejected Hoople’s claim
because the underlying crime, driving while intoxicated, does not
require proof of a culpable mental state.303  Therefore, the court
refused to require proof of a culpable mental state for the
aggravating factor.304
In Patterson v. State,305 the court of appeals upheld the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act306 (“ASORA”) against many
challenges.307  ASORA requires those convicted of sex offenses to
register periodically with the police regardless of when they were
convicted.308  Patterson, who had previously been convicted of first-
degree sexual abuse of a minor, decided not to register because
ASORA was enacted after Patterson was unconditionally
discharged from custody.309
The court of appeals held that ASORA did not violate (1) the
prohibition against ex post facto laws because ASORA was
intended to regulate, not punish, sex offenders; (2) double jeopardy
because Patterson’s failure to register was not a renewed jeopardy
of his original sex offense (registration is a separate duty imposed
on those previously convicted of sex offenses); (3) Patterson’s right
to privacy because the legislature’s interest in public safety is
greater than Patterson’s subjective expectation of privacy; (4)
procedural due process or fundamental fairness because ASORA
does not require any administrative adjudication past the
conviction of the sex offense that invoked the registration
requirement; (5) substantive due process because ASORA is a
legitimate public policy based on the legislature’s concern for
public safety; (6) equal protection because Patterson failed to show
that sex offenders are treated any differently than any similarly
situated group; and (7) Patterson’s plea agreement because the
registration requirement is not a direct result of the agreement, but
rather a collateral consequence of Patterson’s conviction of a sex
offense.310
302. See id.
303. See id. at 1006.
304. See id.
305. 985 P.2d 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
306. See Alaska STAT. §§ 12.63.010 - .100 (LEXIS 1998).
307. See id. at 1019.
308. See id. at 1010.
309. See id. at 1010-11.
310. See id. at 1013-19.
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In Wilkerson v. State,311 the supreme court held that 7 Alaska
Administrative Code 50.210(c)(5) does not violate the due process
or equal protection clauses of the Alaska Constitution.312
Wilkerson was charged with, but not convicted of, several offenses
including assault, weapons possession, and various drug offenses.313
Section 50.210(c)(5) required the Division of Family and Youth
Services (“DFYS”) to deny foster care licenses to applicants who
have been charged with a “serious offense” within ten years of
application.314  The court first rejected Wilkerson’s equal protection
argument that the regulation improperly distinguishes those who
are charged with crimes, but not convicted, from those who are not
charged with crimes.315  The court applied a rational basis review,
since it found Wilkerson’s interest in a foster care license to be
“[a]t most . . . merely economic.”316  It then found a rational basis
for the challenged distinction, pointing out that the State cannot
charge a defendant without at least having “probable cause,” a
standard that requires some evidence to support the charge.317  The
supreme court stated that automatic denial was an efficient means
of eliminating applicants whom the state had reason to believe may
have engaged in criminal behavior.318  The supreme court then
rejected Wilkerson’s substantive due process claim, stating that the
nexus required for substantive due process is lower than the
standard for equal protection.319  Finally, the supreme court held
that the regulation did not violate procedural due process because
the private interest affected is minimal, the possibility of improper
denial is low, and requiring hearings would place a heavy burden
on DFYS.320
B. Equal Protection
In Eldridge v. State Department of Revenue,321 the supreme
court held that Plaintiffs were not denied equal protection when
their applications for Permanent Fund dividends were denied.322
311. 993 P.2d 1018 (Alaska 1999).
312. See id. at 1026.
313. See id. at 1020.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 1022.
316. Id. at 1024.
317. See id. at 1025.
318. See id.
319. See id.
320. See id. at 1026.
321. 988 P.2d 101 (Alaska 1999).
322. See id. at 104.
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Plaintiffs were absent from Alaska for 328 days during 1994;
Alaska law requires residents to be present at least 180 days in
Alaska per calendar year to be eligible for the dividend, or to
qualify under an “allowable absences” provision.323  Plaintiffs
argued that this provision denied them equal protection “because it
treats Alaskans employed by Alaska companies working outside
the state differently than state employees working outside the
state.”324  The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that
the statute conferred an economic interest and therefore was
subject only to minimum scrutiny.325  Under this scrutiny, the court
ruled that the statute bore a fair and substantial relationship to a
legitimate government objective.326
C. The Legislature
In State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union,327 the supreme court
affirmed seven and rejected two of the Alaska Civil Liberty
Union’s challenges to Alaska’s campaign finance reforms.328  Most
significantly, the court invalidated pre-election year and legislative
session contribution bans.329  The court identified the State’s
“legitimate interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption in state election campaigns.”330  Finding many of the
challenged provisions to be “narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest,” the court upheld them.331  However, the court struck
down the bans on pre-election campaign contributions and
contributions to legislative candidates during a regular legislative
session, because these provisions were not sufficiently narrow to
avoid an unconstitutional limitation on free speech.332
In Bess v. Ulmer,333 the supreme court held that Legislative
Resolve No. 59, which would limit prisoners’ rights to those rights
and protections afforded by the United States Constitution, was a
constitutional revision, not an amendment.334  As such, it could be
implemented only through a constitutional convention, not through
323. See id. at 102.
324. Id. at 103.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 104.
327. 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999).
328. See id. at 600.
329. See id.
330. Id. at 601.
331. Id. at 600.
332. See id. at 627.
333. 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999).
334. See id. at 987-88.
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the procedures required for constitutional amendments.335
Additionally, the Supreme Court held that Legislative Resolve No.
71, limiting marriages to persons of the opposite sex, and
Legislative Resolve No. 74, reassigning the power to reapportion
legislative districts from the executive to a neutral body, were
amendments rather than revisions.336
The supreme court noted that the distinction between revision
and amendment, although not precisely defined by the framers,
served the valuable following purposes: promotion of stability,
consideration of the Constitution as an organic whole, and
separation of the legislature from the process of significantly
revising the Constitution.337  Looking to California precedent, the
Alaska Supreme Court determined that the distinction between a
revision and an amendment was one of degree.338  “[A]n enactment
which is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions may well constitute a
revision thereof.”339  The court determined that Legislative Resolve
No. 59 was a constitutional revision because it would “substantially
alter the substance and integrity of the state Constitution,” and it
would potentially alter as many as eleven sections of the Alaska
Constitution.340  The court determined that Legislative Resolution
No. 71 was an amendment because it was sufficiently limited in
quantity and effect, and would not alter the basic governmental
framework.341  The court determined that Legislative Resolution
No. 74 was an amendment despite reassigning executive power,
because it did not deprive the executive of any “foundational
power.”342
In Legislative Council v. Knowles,343 the supreme court held
that Article III, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution prohibited
suits brought in the name of the state to be filed against the
legislature.344  Governor Knowles vetoed a bill which the legislature
335. See id. at 988.  Amendments require approval by two-thirds of each
legislative house and a majority of the voters.  See id. at 982.
336. See id. at 988-89.
337. See id. at 982-84.
338. See id. at 984-87.
339. Id. at 985-86.
340. Id. at 987-88.
341. See id. at 988.
342. Id.
343. 988 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1999).
344. See id. at 605.
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subsequently overrode after the legislative session’s conclusion.345
The Governor sued the Legislative Council to enforce his veto.346
The supreme court concluded that the superior court erred in
deciding the Governor’s claim on its merits.347
In Brooks v. Wright,348 the supreme court held that the state’s
wildlife management role as set forth in Article VIII of the Alaska
Constitution did not give the legislature exclusive lawmaking
powers over natural resource issues.349  Wright brought this action
to remove a ballot initiative that would prohibit the use of snares to
trap wolves.350  The court held that the snare issue was not outside
the state’s initiative power.351  The legislative history of Article VIII
indicates that the delegates intended natural resource issues to be
subject to the initiative process.352  The court further held that
although the language of Article VIII might suggest that a “public
trust” for the management of the state’s wildlife has been created,
such a trust would not confer exclusive lawmaking authority on the
legislature.353
D. Miscellaneous
In International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1264 v.
Municipality of Anchorage,354 the supreme court held that
municipal workers did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in their names and salaries.355  The supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s decision that Anchorage’s practice of releasing
municipal employees’ names and salaries to the Anchorage Daily
News did not violate the constitutional or statutory rights of
employees.356  The court reasoned that this information, even if
disclosed in the personnel records of employees, did not constitute
“sensitive” or “personal” information.357  Since public employment
salary information is not information of a personal nature, its
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See id. at 609.
348. 971 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1999).
349. See id. at 1033.
350. See id. at 1026.
351. See id. at 1033.
352. See id. at 1029.
353. Id. at 1033.
354. 973 P.2d 1132 (Alaska 1999).
355. See id.
356. See id. at 1135.
357. See id. at 1136.
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disclosure is justified by “legitimate public concern.”358  To satisfy
an exception from disclosure, the material must constitute an
invasion of privacy unwarranted by the circumstances.359
In State v. Robart,360 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 44.09.015 prohibited Robart’s use of the state seal
on commemorative coins without permission.361  The court upheld
the statute’s restriction on commercial speech because it did not
impact any non-commercial uses of the seal, was sufficiently
narrow, and advanced a legitimate governmental interest.362
In Weber v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,363 the supreme court
affirmed the superior court order upholding the creation of a utility
special assessment district to finance a privately owned gas-line
extension.364  Weber claimed the pipeline extension was
unconstitutional because it was privately owned and was created to
benefit a private entity.365  Weber further claimed that the
assessment was an unconstitutional taking of his property without
just compensation.366  The supreme court held that the district
conferred a public benefit even though it was privately owned
because providing gas to residents constituted a public use.367  The
supreme court also held that the assessment against Weber was not
an unconstitutional taking of property because the district met the
special benefit requirement, i.e., Weber received a special benefit
from the gas-line extension.368
In Ross v. Alaska,369 the Ninth Circuit dismissed three political
parties’ constitutional challenges to Alaska’s blanket primary: it
dismissed the Republican Party of Alaska’s constitutional
challenge to Alaska’s blanket primary because the Republican
Party of Alaska had already argued identical issues in a prior
Alaska Supreme Court case.370  The Ninth Circuit held that the
Alaskan Independence Party’s challenge to the primary election
law lacked ripeness because the party failed to show the law
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. 988 P.2d 1114 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
361. See id. at 1116.
362. See id. at 1115.
363. 990 P.2d 611 (Alaska 1999).
364. See id. at 612.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See id. at 613.
368. See id. at 614.
369. 189 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).
370. See id. at 1111.
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conflicted in any way with the party’s rules for primary elections.371
Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the Alaska Libertarian Party
failed to establish ripeness because the Alaska primary law did not
prevent the political “group” from deciding how it chooses to
support political candidates.372
VI.  CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure.  In McNeill v. State,373 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that two state troopers’ refusal to leave
McNeill’s house until he answered questions did not constitute
seizure for Miranda purposes.374  The troopers arrived at McNeill’s
house in response to a 911 call made by his wife.375  When the police
arrived, McNeill’s wife informed the troopers of an injury she
received.376  She first claimed that McNeill intentionally inflicted
the wound, causing her to arm herself with a handgun.377  Later, she
claimed to have sustained the wound accidentally.378  The police
officers then spoke with McNeill and refused to leave until he
explained what had happened.379  McNeill stated that he threw his
jacket at his wife and an object in the jacket hit his wife and caused
her injury.380  The supreme court stated that because McNeill’s
wife’s statements were unclear, and because the officers reasonably
believed that violence may have continued if they left, the troopers
were entitled to question McNeill without giving him Miranda
warnings.381  Because the troopers were peaceable and did not exert
pressures that impaired McNeill’s free exercise of his Fourth
Amendment rights, the questioning did not ripen into Miranda
custody.382
371. See id. at 1114.
372. See id. at 1115.
373. 984 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1999).
374. See id. at 7.
375. See id. at 5.
376. See id. at 6.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 7.
382. See id.
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In Mangiapane v. Municipality of Anchorage,383 the court of
appeals held that an officer’s observation of the defendant during
the defendant’s telephone conversation with his attorney did not
necessarily interfere with the defendant’s right to counsel and that
the margin of error of a breath analysis machine was irrelevant to
the defendant’s guilt.384  The court noted that it has been consistent
in its holdings related to the duty of police officers to maintain
custodial observation of a defendant during a breath test.385  The
court reaffirmed that breath tests will be invalidated only if the
police officer intruded upon the defendant’s right to counsel.386
Further, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the jury
should have been instructed that the breath analysis machine has a
margin of specific error, reasoning that such was contrary to the
legislative intent of the statute enabling breath analysis and,
therefore, the error is irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt.387
In Watkinson v. State,388 the court of appeals held that a minor
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when he confessed to
murdering his father and stepmother.389  Watkinson contended that
his confession should be inadmissible because he did not
understand the weight of his crime, had not spoken to his mother,
and was exhausted when he waived his Miranda rights.390  The court
of appeals approved a test that considered surrounding factors in
determining whether a waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary.391
Watkinson seemed lucid and calm in conversation with officers,
had above average intelligence, had rejected several offers to call
his mother, and should have been able to infer that murder was a
very serious charge.392  The mere fact that he was a minor did not
“automatically render him incapable of making a knowing and
voluntary waiver.”393
In Joubert v. Alaska,394 the court of appeals held that the pat-
down search of Joubert for weapons did not justify the search of his
pockets.395  Joubert was handcuffed in front of his apartment
383. 974 P.2d 427 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
384. See id. at 430.
385. See id. at 429.
386. See id.
387. See id. at 429-30.
388. 980 P.2d 469 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
389. See id. at 473.
390. See id. at 471.
391. See id. at 472.
392. See id. at 471.
393. Id. at 472.
394. 977 P.2d 753 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
395. See id. at 756.
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because he was driving a stolen car.396  During a pat-down, police
felt a small, hard object in his pocket.397  Police searched his pocket,
suspecting the object might be a small weapon.398  The court
concluded, under the reasoning of Terry v. Ohio,399 that the police
should not have searched Joubert’s pockets incident to an
investigative stop because they did not suspect the object was
evidence of a stolen vehicle, nor did they have an articulable
suspicion that he was carrying an atypical weapon.400  Thus, the
cocaine seized from Joubert’s pocket could not be used to establish
probable cause for his arrest for cocaine possession.401  The court
explained that Alaska law is more restrictive than federal law in
permitting a police officer to search all of the person and any
possessions found upon that suspect incident to arrest.402
Specifically, “[a] search that precedes an arrest can be justified as
incident to arrest as long as the fruits of the search are not required
to establish cause for the search.”403
In Schaffer v. State,404 the court of appeals held that the search
of Schaffer’s bag by airline personnel could have been state action
subject to constitutional restrictions, and remanded the case to the
superior court to determine if the search was legal under the
“administrative search” exception to the warrant requirement.405
An airline employee searched Schaffer’s bag because Schaffer fit a
criminal profile distributed by the Federal Aviation
Administration.406  Drugs were found, and Schaffer pleaded no
contest to possession but challenged the validity of the search.407
The court of appeals rejected the superior court’s findings that the
search was legal because it was either consented to or private in
nature, rather than state action.408  On remand, the state will have
the burden of showing that the search was justified under the
396. See id. at 754.
397. See id. at 755.
398. See id.
399. 393 U.S. 1 (1968).
400. See Joubert, 977 P.2d at 757.
401. See id.
402. See id.
403. Id. at 756.
404. 988 P.2d 610 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
405. See id. at 612.
406. See id. at 611.
407. See id.
408. See id. at 611-12.
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administrative search exception409 as explained by the Alaska
Supreme Court in State v. Salit.410
In Bohanan v. State,411 the court of appeals affirmed Bohanan’s
conviction because the government’s use of a Glass warrant, which
authorizes tape recording of conversations with a subject, was
adequately supervised.412  Bohanan was convicted of second-degree
sexual assault and attempted first-degree sexual assault for trying
to rape one of his wife’s friends.413  The victim managed to escape
and went to the state police.414  The police obtained a Glass warrant
enabling the victim to try to elicit incriminating statements from
Bohanan over the phone without direct police supervision.415  The
court found that even though a police officer was not present
during the telephone conversation, the Glass warrant was valid.416
Futher, the court found that the victim’s husband’s participation in
a telephone conversation when he was not listed on the Glass
warrant was admissible because the police did not plan for him to
participate, and, therefore, the husband was not an agent of the
police.417
In Gengler v. State,418 the court of appeals held that failure to
timely perform the scheduled verification of a machine used to test
suspects’ breath for intoxication was irrelevant without evidence
that the machine was out of calibration when the next test was
performed.419  Although the court of appeals agreed that Gengler
should be able to attack the accuracy of the breath test result, it
ruled that, without accompanying proof that the machine was out
of calibration, the simple fact that the next scheduled test was
missed had no bearing on the accuracy of Gengler’s test.420
In Vigue v. State,421 the court held that Vigue had been
properly arrested after an initial investigative stop, but reversed
Vigue’s conviction for tampering with physical evidence.422  Vigue
was the subject of an investigative stop after a policeman saw him
409. See id. at 616.
410. 613 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1980).
411. 992 P.2d 596 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
412. See id. at 604.
413. See id.
414. See id.
415. See id.
416. See id. at 603.
417. See id.
418. 969 P.2d 1164 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
419. See id. at 1167.
420. See id. at 1166-67.
421. 987 P.2d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
422. See id.
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in what appeared to be the act of public urination.423  In view of the
police officer and immediately prior to the investigative stop,
Vigue discarded what turned out to be crack cocaine.424  Vigue was
subsequently charged with possession of crack cocaine and with
tampering with physical evidence.425  Vigue was convicted on both
counts.426
The court held that Vigue had not committed the actus reus
required for tampering under Alaska Statutes section
11.56.610(a)(1).427  The legislature did not intend to inflict greater
punishment upon an individual who discarded evidence of a crime
than he or she would receive for the commission of that crime.428
According to the court, “a person who possesses drugs may not be
found guilty of tampering with evidence simply because he discards
or hides the drugs upon the approach of a police officer.”429
In Smith v. State,430 the court of appeals held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in applying the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule.431  Smith was arrested related to
a drug transaction.432  Before reading Smith his Miranda rights, the
arresting police officer asked Smith for routine information
including his address.433  The police obtained a search warrant for
his home and found more drugs and drug paraphernalia.434  Smith
claims that because he was not read his Miranda rights before he
was asked for his address the evidence gathered at his home should
be suppressed.435  The trial court applied the inevitable discovery
exception to the evidence because the police officers had
independent verification of Smith’s address from his vehicle
registration.436  The trial court also noted that the police were not
acting in bad faith when they asked Smith for his address, because
an address is standard booking information.437
423. See id.
424. See id.
425. See id. at 205.
426. See id.
427. See id. at 206.
428. See id. at 209.
429. Id.
430. 992 P.2d 605 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
431. See id. at 612.
432. See id. at 605.
433. See id.
434. See id.
435. See id.
436. See id. at 610.
437. See id.
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2. Miscellaneous.  In Reyes v. State,438 the supreme court held
that the trial judge violated double jeopardy by imposing an
additional condition on the defendant’s existing parole.439  Reyes
was convicted of three counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a
minor and was sentenced to twelve years and nine months.440
Between the original sentencing and re-sentencing, the State
stopped paying for the victim’s rehabilitation, leaving that burden
entirely on the victim’s family.441  During re-sentencing, the trial
court added restitution for the cost of the victim’s counseling as a
condition to Reyes’ already existing probation.442  The supreme
court noted that although trial courts are authorized to modify
probation conditions, a change in state law regarding rehabilitation
repayments by convicts did not constitute a reasonable basis for
imposing more severe conditions.443
In Walker v. State,444 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 11.71.050(a)(3)(E), which criminalizes possession
of eight ounces or more of marijuana, did not violate the right to
privacy guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution.445  Based on an
anonymous tip, the Fairbanks police went to Walker’s house to
check on a reported indoor marijuana garden.446  Walker showed
the officers a bag of marijuana and his indoor garden containing
many marijuana plants and seedlings.447  Walker claimed that based
on the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Ravin v. State,448 AS
11.71.050(a)(3)(E) violated his right to privacy.449
In Ravin, the supreme court held that the right to privacy
guaranteed in the Alaska Constitution encompassed the possession
and use of marijuana in the home if such use is purely personal and
non-commercial.450  After the Ravin decision, the legislature
defined the amount that could be possessed for personal use in a
home to be four ounces or less.451  The court of appeals held that
eight ounces or more of marijuana is properly considered a
438. 978 P.2d 635 (Alaska 1999).
439. See id. at 641.
440. See id. at 636.
441. See id. at 637.
442. See id. at 638.
443. See id. at 640.
444. 991 P.2d 799 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
445. See id. at 803.
446. See id. at 800.
447. See id.
448. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
449. See Walker, 991 P.2d at 800.
450. See id. at 801.
451. See id. at 802.
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commercial amount even if it is only possessed in a residence for
personal use.452  Therefore, AS 11.71.050(a)(3)(E) did not violate
the right to privacy guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution.453
B. General Criminal Law
1. Criminal Procedure.  In Peterson v. State,454 the court of
appeals held that Peterson could withdraw his no contest plea in a
sexual assault case because the court had failed to inform him of
the sex offender registration law.455  Peterson was charged with
first-degree sexual assault.456  In exchange for a no contest plea,
Peterson’s charges were reduced to second-degree sexual assault.457
Peterson alleged that he would not have entered a no contest plea
if he had known of the sex offender registration requirement.458
The court concluded that the legislature expressly amended
Criminal Rule 11(c) to include a warning to those charged with sex
offenses, in order to ensure that defendants would consider the
consequence of their pleas.459  Further, the court held that failure to
inform a defendant of the registration requirement is potentially
manifest injustice for purposes of Criminal Rule 11(h)(3), which
allows for the withdrawal of pleas when failure to allow the
withdrawal would result in manifest injustice.460
In Burrece v. State,461 the court of appeals upheld a search
warrant and ruled that the trial court’s error in violating a statute
governing telephonic testimony was harmless and did not prejudice
the case.462  According to the court of appeals, Burrece did not
show or argue any bad faith on the part of the testifying officer or
the court.463 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the no contest plea
of the defendant for fourth-degree misconduct involving a
controlled substance.464
452. See id. at 803.
453. See id.
454. 988 P.2d 109 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
455. See id. at 120.
456. See id. at 112.
457. See id.
458. See id.
459. See id. at 118.
460. See id. at 119.
461. 976 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1999).
462. See id. at 244.
463. See id.
464. See id.
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Burrece had been arrested for growing marijuana in a
boarded-up trailer.465  She had claimed that the tip supporting the
arrest warrant was stale because it was four months old.466  She also
claimed that the evidence of electronic consumption which
indicated the site of marijuana cultivation could not corroborate
the tip from Alaska State Trooper Timothy L. Bleicher.467  Burrece
claimed that the district court’s reliance on the state trooper’s
telephonic testimony that supplemented his affidavit was
impermissible.468  In disagreeing, the court of appeals concluded
that, “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances . . . Judge
Ashman could properly find the information before him provided
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a marijuana grow
would be found when he issued the warrant.”469
In Davidson v. State,470 the court of appeals held that the
superior court judge did not err when he asked the jury to clarify
their decision.471  The jury’s verdict forms indicated that they found
the defendant guilty of assault in the first degree, but that they did
not find him guilty of several lesser-included offenses.472  When the
defendant moved for a new trial arguing that the jury’s verdict was
inconsistent, the judge reconvened the jury and asked them to
clarify their decision.473  The jury responded that they did not
realize they could find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included
offenses and then changed the verdict form to indicate they also
found the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offenses.474  The
court of appeals held that while Alaska Evidence Rule 606
prevents asking a jury to justify their verdict or to explain how they
arrived at a decision, Rule 606 does not prevent asking a jury to
clarify its decision.475
In Taylor v. State,476 the court of appeals held that the superior
court did not violate a criminal defendant’s rights when it allowed a
witness to explain ex parte why her testimony would be self-
incriminating.477  The defendant was on trial for assaulting his wife,
465. See id. at 242.
466. See id.
467. See id.
468. See id.
469. See id. at 243.
470. 975 P.2d 67 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
471. See id. at 73.
472. See id. at 70.
473. See id. at 70-71.
474. See id. at 71.
475. See id. at 73-74.
476. 977 P.2d 123 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
477. See id. at 130.
YIR.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:17 AM
2000] YEAR IN REVIEW 201
a security guard, and a police officer.478  The court permitted the
defendant’s wife to explain ex parte why she refused to testify on
the grounds of self-incrimination.479  The defendant appealed on
grounds that the ex parte hearing violated his right to due process
as well as his rights under Criminal Rule 38(a).480  The court held
that a defendant’s right to be present at all proceedings may be
waived by the trial judge when a witness asserts a privilege against
self-incrimination.481  The court provided a set of factors for judges
to weigh in these situations: “(1) the privilege-claimer’s interest
in . . . [not] revealing protected information to others, (2) the
defendant’s . . . interests in being present during . . . the
proceedings, and (3) the public’s interest in assuring that the justice
system operates in the public view and subject to public scrutiny.”482
In State v. Couch,483 the court of appeals held that the trial
court abused its discretion under Criminal Rule 35(b)(1) when it
granted a temporary release to an inmate to visit his dying
grandfather more than 180 days after the distribution of the written
judgment.484  Couch’s grandfather became seriously ill during
Couch’s incarceration, and Couch petitioned the court for a
furlough to be with him.485 Criminal Rule 35(b)(1) permits a trial
judge to modify or reduce a sentence within 180 days of the
distribution of the written judgment.486  The court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s ruling because the 180-day post-judgment
period had expired.487  Since convict furloughs are within the
authority of the Department of Corrections and not the judiciary,
the court of appeals reasoned that to allow the trial court to order a
furlough after the 180-day limit had expired would improperly
impinge on the executive branch of government.488
In Dutton v. State,489 the court of appeals held that changing a
federal felony plea as required by a plea agreement constituted a
material breach of the plea agreement.490  Under these
circumstances, the double jeopardy clause did not prevent the
478. See id. at 124.
479. See id. at 125.
480. See id.
481. See id. at 129.
482. Id.
483. 999 P.2d 1286 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
484. See id. at 1287.
485. See id.
486. See id.
487. See id. at 1289.
488. See id.
489. 970 P.2d 925 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
490. See id. at 930.
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superior court from vacating the misdemeanor conviction and
reinstating the original charge.491  Plea agreements are considered
enforceable contracts between a defendant and the government.492
Materially breaching the terms of a plea agreement in this case
required rescission, thereby placing the parties in status quo ante.493
Further, for double jeopardy to be circumvented, the government
is not required to include special clauses in a plea agreement
stating that the original charges will be reinstated if the plea
agreement is not followed.494  It is assumed when a defendant enters
into a plea agreement that if he does not uphold his end of the
bargain, the government will not be bound by the agreement.495
In Fermin v. State,496 the court of appeals held that a
defendant’s flight does not waive his right to appeal, but a fleeing
defendant must show good cause before the appeal will be
reinstated.497  Fermin appealed his conviction and fled Alaska
shortly thereafter.498  The appeal proceeded and was eventually
dismissed because of Fermin’s absence.499  Fermin argued his
appeal should be reinstated because it was unfair for the court to
proceed with his appeal in his absence.500  The court of appeals
ruled there was no good cause to reinstate Fermin’s appeal because
defendants who voluntarily abscond from court hearings have no
right to complain when the hearings proceed without them.501
In State v. Aloysius,502 the court of appeals reinstated an
indictment because irregularities in telephonic testimony and
dismissal of two alternate grand jurors did not unfairly prejudice
Aloysius.503  The superior court had invalidated an indictment
because the prosecutor had taken a witnesses’s testimony over the
telephone without asking the witness to verify that he/she was
alone and that no one else could hear what was being said.504  In
another instance, the prosecutor asked questions without waiting
491. See id. at 935.
492. See id. at 928.
493. See id. at 938.
494. See id. at 935.
495. See id.
496. 975 P.2d 61 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
497. See id. at 62.
498. See id.
499. See id.
500. See id. at 64.
501. See id.
502. 975 P.2d 1096 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
503. See id. at 1097.
504. See id.
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until the witnesses were sworn in.505  Also, despite Criminal Rule
6(f)’s requirement that alternate grand jurors be impaneled in the
order in which they were designated, the prosecutor excused the
two middle alternates.506  The indictment was reinstated, however,
because the defense failed to show that the telephone irregularities
affected the testimony or the grand jury’s decision to return the
indictment,507 and the error in juror impanelment was not shown to
result from the prosecution’s attempt to gain a favorable panel.508
In Collins v. State,509 the court of appeals held that the rule
requiring court certification of expert witnesses did not apply to
police officers testifying about their observations from work
experience.510  Collins ran a crack house and drug dealing operation
from an apartment in which police discovered several items
associated with the drug trade, including ledgers, beepers, scales,
plastic bags, and traces of cocaine.511  Even though Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 16(b)(1)(B) generally requires court certification
for expert witnesses, the court stated that such approval was
unnecessary for police officers who made observations and
conclusions based on their training and experience.512  In this case,
Anchorage police officers testified as to the common
characteristics of crack houses they had seen in the line of duty.513
In Sivertsen v. State,514 the supreme court held that, although
the prosecutor’s closing argument was objectionable,515 any
resulting procedural error was harmless.516  Sivertsen was convicted
of second-degree burglary and theft.517  The police saw him
breaking out of a building at two o’clock in the morning.518
Sivertsen was subsequently apprehended with $600 in cash, which
was the amount of money missing from a store in the building.519
The court noted that the prosecutor’s argument that the jury may
“assume” Sivertsen’s criminal intent from evidence of his actions
505. See id.
506. See id.; see also ALASKA CRIM. R. 6(f).
507. See Aloysius, 975 P.2d at 1097.
508. See id. at 1099.
509. 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
510. See id.
511. See id. at 744.
512. See id.
513. See id.
514. 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999).
515. See id. at 565.
516. See id.
517. See id.
518. See id.
519. See id.
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amounted to the functional equivalent of telling the jury that the
law “presumes” intent from conduct.520  Jurors might incorrectly
assume that evidence of conduct is automatically sufficient to prove
intent, either conclusively or presumptively, in violation of due
process.521  However, the prosecutor’s statement was harmless
because of the trial court’s instructions and the evidence against
Sivertsen.522  The court found it unlikely that the prosecutor’s
statement contributed in any substantial way to the jury’s guilty
verdict.523
In A.A. v. State,524  the supreme court held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied A.A.’s motion to
continue a hearing on a petition to terminate his parental rights.525
A.A.’s paternity of I.K. was established while A.A. was serving a
prison sentence for his murder conviction.526  The court of appeals
later overturned the murder conviction, but the Child Support
Enforcement Division still sought to terminate A.A.’s parental
rights.527  The trial court denied A.A.’s motion to continue the
hearing after his new murder trial and terminated A.A.’s parental
rights based on his extensive history of violent behavior.528  The
supreme court affirmed, observing that the trial court based its
termination of A.A.’s parental rights on his history of violence,
rather than his murder conviction.529  Also, further delay would
jeopardize the child’s best interest by hindering his timely
placement in a stable home.530
In Hosier v. State,531 the court of appeals held that neither the
federal nor the state constitution created an entitlement to post-
conviction bail.532  Hosier was convicted of forgery and theft and
was denied bail pending his appeal.533  Hosier argued that Alaska
Statutes section 12.30.040(b)(2), which prohibited his release
pending appeal due to prior and current felony convictions. was
520. See id. at 566.
521. See id.
522. See id. at 565.
523. See id. at 567.
524. 982 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1999).
525. See id. at 258.
526. See id. at 259.
527. See id. at 258.
528. See id. at 260.
529. See id.
530. See id.
531. 976 P.2d 869 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
532. See id. at 871.
533. See id. at 870.
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unconstitutional.534  The court first held that Article I, section 12 of
the Alaska Constitution is not intended to grant a right to
postconviction bail because it parallels the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which has been interpreted not to
grant a right to post-conviction bail.535  Moreover, the court
reasoned that while the Alaska Constitution may grant a right to
bail in Article I, Section 12, “it does not guarantee any greater right
to bail than the pre-conviction bail guaranteed by [Article I,]
Section 11.”536
In Brant v. State,537 the court of appeals held that, for purposes
of Alaska Statutes section 11.61.200(a)(1), a felon is “convicted of a
felony” once he or she has entered a plea or has been found guilty
of a felony; it is not necessary for the felon to have also been
sentenced before this status takes effect.538  After pleading no
contest to assault but before sentencing was imposed, two co-
defendants were indicted for misconduct involving weapons,
because they were felons in possession of a concealable firearm.539
Defendants argued they could not be charged with this crime
because they technically did not become felons until the trial court
entered a sentence.540  They contended that because the term
“convicted” is not defined in the code, it should be interpreted
most favorably toward defendants.541  The court of appeals rejected
this argument, reasoning that “the procedural step of sentencing
does not provide any additional confirmation that a defendant
engaged in conduct that permits classification of the defendant as a
felon.”542  The court noted that in many statutes, the legislature
requires both conviction and sentencing before certain laws would
be triggered; the fact that this particular statute does not mention
sentencing militates in favor of not requiring it.543
In Saathoff v. State,544 the court of appeals held that the five-
year statute of limitations for second-degree theft prohibited the
State from prosecuting a defendant in 1997 for a theft he
534. See id.
535. See id.
536. Id. at 871.
537. 992 P.2d 590 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
538. See id.
539. See id. at 591.
540. See id.
541. See id.
542. Id. at 592.
543. See id.
544. 991 P.2d 1280 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
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committed in 1988.545  In 1988, Saathoff knowingly purchased a
stolen gun.546  In 1997, the State attempted to prosecute Saathoff,
arguing that the prosecution was timely because the charged
offense was “theft by receiving,” which continues for as long as the
defendant retains the stolen property.547  The court of appeals held
that under Alaska law, theft by receiving is not a continuing
offense, and the statute of limitations for retention of stolen
property is identical to the statue of limitations for all other theft
offenses.548  This means that the statue of limitations begins to
accrue as soon as the defendant is aware that he or she has retained
stolen property.549  The court reasoned that the legislature meant to
create a “unified” theft statute, where every form of theft is subject
to the same statute of limitations, based on the legislative history
and the legislature’s reliance on the Model Penal Code.550
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena,551 the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska held that financial institutions are
obligated to comply with federal grand jury subpoenas regardless
of whether the subpoenas are accompanied by court orders.552  The
National Bank of Alaska (“NBA”) was served with a federal grand
jury subpoena duces tecum that required it to produce depositor
records.553  NBA filed a motion to quash the subpoena because the
subpoena was not accompanied by a court order, which they
argued was required by Alaska Statutes section 06.05.175(a)(1).554
The court noted that the legislative intent of this statute indicated
banks were not obligated to release financial information without a
court order.555  The court further noted, however, that the
legislators did not look closely at a subsequent statute, which states
that the records should be released if “disclosure is required by
federal or state law or regulation.”556  The court held that this
subsequent statute made it clear there is no requirement that a
court order accompany a grand jury subpoena.557
545. See id. at 1281.
546. See id.
547. See id.
548. See id. at 1282.
549. See id.
550. See id. at 1285-86.
551. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (D. Alaska 1999).
552. See id. at 1037.
553. See id. at 1028.
554. See id.
555. See id. at 1031.
556. Id.
557. See id.
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2. Evidence.  In Martin v. State,558 the court of appeals held
that the trial court correctly considered Martin’s history of sex
crimes even though Martin’s present trial involved only drug-
related charges.559  Although in the present drug trial there was no
charge for sexual assault, the trial court properly considered
Martin’s history of sex crimes, including spousal abuse, a felony
conviction for attempted rape, and assault of a woman in a bar.560
According to the court, these prior acts illuminated Martin’s
motive for distributing cocaine: to facilitate rape.561  The court of
appeals also rejected the argument that requiring Martin to attend
sex offender counseling was excessive and inappropriate for a drug
conviction.562  The court concluded that the sentence was
reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the drug offender and
the protection of the public, and therefore a direct relation was not
necessary.563
In State v. Coon,564 the supreme court held that the trial court
properly admitted scientific evidence based on standards
articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.565 and
the Alaska Rules of Evidence.566  Coon, who was convicted of
making terroristic telephone calls, argued that the scientific
evidence (voice spectrographic analysis) admitted to convict him
did not satisfy the Frye v. United States test.567  The supreme court
held that Daubert and the Alaska Rules of Evidence now govern
the admissibility of scientific evidence.568  Coon also argued that
since Daubert was decided after his trial, the use of the Daubert
standard was prohibited as ex post facto legislation.569  The supreme
court held that the prohibition on ex post facto legislation does not
apply to judicial decisions concerning the admissibility of
evidence.570
In Smithart v. State,571 the supreme court held that the trial
court erred in not allowing the defendant to present evidence that
558. 973 P.2d 1151 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
559. See id. at 1156.
560. See id.
561. See id.
562. See id. at 1159.
563. See id. at 1157.
564. 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999).
565. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
566. See Coon, 974 P.2d at 388.
567. See id. at 391 (citing Frey, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
568. See id. at 402.
569. See id. at 391.
570. See id. at 392.
571. 988 P.2d 583 (Alaska 1999).
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another man committed the charged crimes.572  Smithart was
charged with kidnapping, first-degree sexual-assault, and first-
degree murder of an eleven-year-old girl.573  Smithart wanted to
introduce evidence that another person had perpetrated the
crimes.574  Generally, under Alaska law, a defendant may suggest
that another person was the actual perpetrator.575  However,
evidence that a specific third party committed the crime is subject
to a somewhat higher standard, i.e., other-suspect evidence is
admissible if the evidence “links the third-party [to the crime] in a
way that tends to create doubt about the defendant’s guilt.”576
Smithart wished to present evidence that the prosecution’s key
witness had committed the crimes based on paint chips from the
witness’s shop matching those found near the victim.577  The
supreme court ruled that denial of this evidence was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.578
In Alaska v. Bingaman,579 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4), allowing the introduction of evidence
from other crimes involving domestic violence by the defendant in
a domestic violence prosecution, did not require proof of
conviction before the evidence could be admitted at trial.580
Bingaman was charged with assault and sexual abuse of a minor.581
At trial, the judge entered an order excluding evidence of
Bingaman’s prior domestic violence crimes.582  The court of appeals
reversed the order, reasoning that prior case law interpreting other
sections of Rule 404(b), the language of the Rule itself, and its
legislative history all demonstrated that the legislature intended no
requirement of  proof of conviction of prior bad acts before such
other bad acts may be admitted at trial.583
In Wyatt v. Alaska,584 the supreme court held that a witness’s
“lethal situation” statement was admissible under the “state of
mind” exception to the hearsay rule.585  Wyatt was convicted of
572. See id. at 585.
573. See id.
574. See id.
575. See id. at 586.
576. Id. at 587.
577. See id. at 590.
578. See id. at 587.
579. 991 P.2d 227 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
580. See id. at 228-29.
581. See id. at 229.
582. See id.
583. See id. at 230.
584. 981 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1999).
585. See id. at 115.
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murdering his wife.586  The trial court admitted a witness’s
statement that Wyatt’s wife had told her that “[t]here was a
possible lethal situation when she told her husband about [the
divorce].”587  Such testimony could not be used to prove that Wyatt
killed his wife, but the statement could be used to indicate the
wife’s intention to obtain a divorce.588  Because the state relied on
the wife’s intent to divorce in order to establish Wyatt’s motive,
and Wyatt disputed her intent to divorce, the statement was
admissible to prove the wife’s intent under the “state of mind”
hearsay exception.589
In Wasserman v. Bartholomew,590 the supreme court held that
the trial court should have allowed evidence rebutting allegations
of witness bias.591  Wasserman sued the local and state governments
and three police officers on the ground that the officers used
excessive force when apprehending him.592  At trial, Wasserman’s
account of the force used by the police differed from the defendant
police officer’s account, and Wasserman tried to introduce
corroborative testimony of a civilian witness and another officer.593
The trial court disallowed both witnesses’s testimony on the ground
that it was cumulative.594  In reversing, the supreme court held that
the testimony was not cumulative because it supported the
contested facts.595
In Ashenfelter v. State,596 the court of appeals held that the
State relied improperly during sentencing on hearsay evidence of
an aggravating factor where Ashenfelter took the stand and refuted
the State’s factual allegations.597  During sentencing, the State used
hearsay evidence to prove an aggravating factor in Ashenfelter’s
trial for assault.598  Under supreme court precedent, a defendant has
a right to confront his accusers in court once he has taken the stand
and refuted the State’s allegations.599  The supreme court held that
the trial court improperly allowed the hearsay evidence when the
586. See id. at 110.
587. Id. at 111.
588. See id. at 114.
589. See id. at 114-15.
590. 987 P.2d 748 (Alaska 1999).
591. See id. at 752.
592. See id. at 750.
593. See id. at 751.
594. See id.
595. See id. at 753.
596. 988 P.2d 120 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
597. See id. at 127.
598. See id. at 122.
599. See id. at 127.
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judge disbelieved Ashenfelter’s testimony; regardless of
Ashenfelter’s credibility, once he took the stand, the supreme court
ruled, the State could no longer rely on hearsay evidence.600
3. Sentencing.  In Brown v. State,601 the court of appeals found
a 55-year sentence for second-degree murder to be excessive
absent aggravating factors.602  During a dispute over money in a
cocaine transaction, Dixson, the victim, produced his gun, which
Brown grabbed and aimed at Dixson.603  Dixson’s wife then entered
the room and stood between Brown and Dixson.604  Brown shot
Dixson when, according to Brown, he was jostled by Dixson’s
wife.605  The lower court, in imposing the 55-year sentence, decided
that the main sentencing goals were to isolate Brown and reaffirm
social norms.606  The lower court reasoned that it was desirable to
isolate Brown for as long as possible because his use of a gun and
his involvement in the drug trade showed him to be dangerous, and
there was a strong possibility he would return to the drug trade
when released.607  The court of appeals, applying the Page 20-30
year benchmark,608 noted that 55 years was excessive because
Brown had no prior record, turned himself in voluntarily, and was
responding to Dixson’s introduction of deadly force.609  Thus, the
murder was not the “gratuitous or otherwise inexplicable act of
extreme violence required for a departure from the Page
benchmark.”610
In George v. State,611 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 12.55.085(f)(1) would not prevent the trial court
from granting George a suspended imposition of sentence
(“SIS”).612  George was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery
after he helped Chevy Miller rob a McDonald’s by furnishing
information about the store’s security systems, granting entry to
600. See id.
601. 973 P.2d 1158 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
602. See id. at 1159.
603. See id. at 1160.
604. See id.
605. See id.
606. See id.
607. See id.
608. Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (establishing a
benchmark sentencing range for second-degree murder of 20-30 years).
609. See Brown, 973 P.2d at 1164.
610. Id.
611. 988 P.2d 1116 (Alaska 1999).
612. See id. at 1116-17.
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the store, and hiding incriminating evidence.613  The court of
appeals noted that section 12.55.085(f)(1) prohibits imposition of
an SIS to persons convicted of robbery in the first degree.614
Because conspiracy involves a wide range of activity, the court of
appeals could not conclude with certainty that the legislature
intended to bar courts from granting an SIS to a person convicted
of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree.615  Therefore,
the trial court had the discretion to impose an SIS on George.616
In Dawson v. State,617 the court of appeals held that a four-year
sentence for selling cocaine at only a small retail level was
excessive.618  Dawson was a first-time felony offender whose
activities resembled those of the defendant in Major v. State.619
Based on Major, the court of appeals reversed Dawson’s sentence
and instructed the superior court to sentence him to no more than
6 years with 3 years suspended.620
In Krack v. State,621 the court of appeals held that a twenty-
eight year prison term for child sexual abuse and drug offenses was
not excessive.622  Krack’s sentence was divided into two components
to be served consecutively: fifteen years for drug possession, which
was the maximum that his plea agreement would allow, and
thirteen years for second-degree sexual abuse of a minor.623  The
court did not look to its past sentences for second-degree sexual
abuse of a minor because Krack also distributed drugs to the
minors.624  Krack’s behavior was plainly aggravated, and he could
have received a substantially longer sentence for his drug offenses
alone.625  The court held that, given the entirety of defendant’s
conduct and history, the combined sentence was severe but not
improper.626
613. See id.
614. See id.
615. See id.
616. See id. at 1118.
617. 977 P.2d 121 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
618. See id. at 123.
619. See id. at 121 (citing Major v. State, 798 P.2d 341 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that four years imprisonment was excessive and instructing the superior
court to sentence defendant to no more than six years with three years
suspended)).
620. See id.
621. 973 P.2d 100 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
622. See id. at 105.
623. See id. at 103-04.
624. See id. at 104-05.
625. See id. at 105.
626. See id.
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4. Miscellaneous.  In State v. Otness,627 the supreme court held
that the Department of Public Safety’s definition of conviction,
which required registration of any person who had a sex crime
conviction set aside, was a reasonable construction of the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”).628  Each defendant
was convicted of a sex crime and was required by ASORA to
register at the local police or state trooper station nearest to their
residence.629  The legislature did not define “conviction” but instead
authorized the Department of Public Safety to implement the act.630
In so doing, the Department of Public Safety defined “conviction”
to include convictions that were later set aside.631  The supreme
court stated that the Department’s definition was consistent with
the purposes of ASORA.632
In Orr-Hickey v. Alaska,633 the court of appeals established
civil negligence as the culpable mental state for hunting offenses.634
The trial court convicted Orr-Hickey of hunting sheep in a closed
area and of possessing illegally-taken game.635  Orr-Hickey claimed
that the jury received flawed instructions concerning the culpable
mental state required for these crimes.636  Specifically, Orr-Hickey
argued that Alaska Statutes section 11.81.610(b)(2) superseded the
court’s holding in State v. Rice637 that negligence is the applicable
culpable mental state for hunting offenses.638  However, the court of
appeals held that civil negligence, not recklessness, was the
culpable mental state that governed hunting offenses.639
Furthermore, the court held that AS 12.55.085(f)(2) includes
hunting offenses and precludes suspension of imposition of
sentence in cases such as this where Orr-Hickey used a firearm in
the commission of an offense.640
In Jacko v. State,641 the court of appeals affirmed Jacko’s
conviction for violating a domestic violence protective order.642
627. 986 P.2d 890 (Alaska 1999).
628. See id. at 892.
629. See id. at 891.
630. See id.
631. See id.
632. See id. at 892.
633. 973 P.2d 612 (Alaska 1999).
634. See id. at 614.
635. See id.
636. See id.
637. 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
638. See Orr-Hickey, 973 P.2d at 614.
639. See id.
640. See id. at 615.
641. 981 P.2d 1075 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
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Jacko appealed his conviction based on the district court’s
retrospective finding that the original protective order was without
merit.643  The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that
even though the protective order was unjustified, the person
subject to that order must obey it until it is either vacated or
reversed.644  According to the court, this rule preserves peace,
order, and the judicial process.645
In Harris v. State,646 the court of appeals articulated several
conditions under which courts should grant a petition to revoke
probation.647  Harris violated a sex offense probation by being
charged with assaulting his girlfriend,648 refusing to be tested for
controlled substances,649 and living with minors.650  He first appealed
the subsequent revocation of his probation on the ground that the
charge of assaulting his girlfriend had been dismissed.651  The court
held that merely being charged with criminal conduct can be
grounds for revocation of probation.652  Harris next argued that
because his refusals to submit to drug testing came after the initial
petition to revoke, his refusals could not be considered.653  As soon
as the petition was filed, Harris suggested, he was no longer subject
to the conditions of probation.654  The court disagreed, stating that
unless the conditions of probation continued to apply, the system
would reward criminals who drew petitions to revoke.655  Finally,
Harris argued that since his probation officer knew he was living
with minors and did nothing about it, this violation could not be
considered by the court in revoking the petition.656  The court ruled
that the probation officer’s failure to act did not imply a tacit
approval of the violation such that the violation could not be
considered.657
642. See id. at 1076.
643. See id. at 1077.
644. See id.
645. See id.
646. 980 P.2d 482 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
647. See id. at 483.
648. See id.
649. See id. at 484.
650. See id. at 485.
651. See id. at 484.
652. See id.
653. See id.
654. See id.
655. See id. at 485.
656. See id. at 486.
657. See id.
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In Beltz v. State,658 the court of appeals held that “fellatio” and
“cunnilingus,” as used in a sex crime statute, did not require a
showing that one or both participants derived sexual satisfaction.659
A convicted child molester argued that because a sex offense
statute did not define either of the terms, the jury should have been
instructed according to the dictionary meaning, which sometimes
included a requirement that the parties derive pleasure from the
act.660  The court disagreed, observing that the statute’s legislative
history specifically stated that all that needed to be shown was the
occurrence of the sexual contact.661  In addition, the court rejected
Beltz’s contention that the confession that led to his prosecution
was involuntary.662  A law enforcement officer’s friendly disposition
does not render the confession involuntary, nor does the suggestion
that Beltz’s cooperation would lead to more lenient treatment.663
The court considered the fact that Beltz had himself been a law
enforcement officer and was therefore a sophisticated party.664
In Whitehead v. State,665 the court of appeals held that a judge
cannot require a defendant to register as a sex offender as a special
condition of probation when the conviction is not considered a “sex
offense” within the meaning of Alaska Statutes section 12.63.100.666
Whitehead pled no contest to a single count of coercion for
assaulting a sleeping victim in a privately-run halfway house where
he worked as a janitor.667  The court of appeals acknowledged that
as a general rule, conditions of probation that are reasonably
related to the probationer’s rehabilitation or the protection of the
public are acceptable.668  However, when the legislature passed the
law requiring sex offender registration, it specified the offenses that
trigger a registration requirement, and there is no component of
the law that authorizes a judge to impose a registration
requirement upon sex offenders as a part of probation.669
In King v. State,670 the court of appeals held that a sleeping
person is considered “incapacitated” for purposes of the second-
658. 980 P.2d 474 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
659. See id. at 476.
660. See id.
661. See id.
662. See id. at 478.
663. See id.
664. See id.
665. 985 P.2d 1019 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
666. See id. at 1020 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.100 (Michie 1998)).
667. See id.
668. See id.
669. See id.
670. 978 P.2d 1278 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
YIR.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:17 AM
2000] YEAR IN REVIEW 215
degree sexual assault statute.671  The court held that a sleeping
person is “temporarily incapable of appraising the nature of one’s
own conduct” and “physically unable to express unwillingness to
act,” thus satisfying the statutory definition of incapacitated.672
In State v. Morgan,673 the court of appeals held that a credit
card number was a credit card for the purposes of Alaska Statutes
section 11.46.290(a), which prohibits obtaining a credit card by
fraudulent means.674  Morgan received an AT&T calling card
number, not the actual card, from a fellow inmate as payment for a
debt.675  He proceeded to make $3,669.45 worth of long-distance
phone calls without the card owner’s permission.676  The court
found that the card number constituted a “device” used to obtain
goods or services on credit.677  Therefore, a person can be convicted
of obtaining a credit card by fraudulent means by obtaining merely
the credit card number.678
VII.  EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Discrimination
In VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock,679 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that an employer could be vicariously liable for acts of a supervisor
who created a hostile working environment, even where the acts
were outside the scope of the supervisor’s employment.680
However, punitive damages could not be imposed for a
supervisor’s activities outside of employment: the court concluded
it was unfair to punish an employer for acts committed by
employees who were not at all pursuing the employer’s
objectives.681  Defendants employed Kotowski to assist in the
cleanup of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.682  Kotowski’s supervisor
subjected her to numerous unwanted sexual advances, and the
supervisor made it apparent that sexual favors could be exchanged
671. See id. at 1279 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.420(a)(3)(B) (Michie 1998)).
672. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(2) (Michie 1998)).
673. 985 P.2d 1022 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
674. See id.
675. See id.
676. See id.
677. Id. at 1024.
678. See id.
679. 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).
680. See id. at 908.
681. See id.
682. See id. at 909.
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for his favorable treatment.683  When Kotowski reported her
supervisor’s behavior, she was interrogated and subsequently
terminated.684  Borrowing from Justice Marshall’s reasoning in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,685 the supreme court found it
appropriate to hold the employer liable for the outside-
employment wrongs of the supervisor because “it is precisely
because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the
employer’s authority that he is able to impose unwelcome sexual
conduct on subordinates.”686
In Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, 687 the supreme court decided that
one of the defendants from VECO, Inc. v. Rosebrock688 should be
held liable for punitive damages, but that an award of nearly $4
million in punitive damages, in addition to $8,494.40 in lost
earnings and $1,850 for emotional distress, was excessive in light of
numerous considerations stemming from both policy and the facts
of the case.689  The supreme court affirmed that punitive damages
could be awarded for “outrageous” conduct that was malicious or
undertaken with “reckless indifference” to the interests of others.690
Since the treatment Kotowski received at her supervisor’s hands
showed reckless indifference, punitive damages were proper.691
However, the court concluded the punitive damages award was
excessive given a number of factors, including duration of the
harassment, policy, offender’s wealth, and amount of
compensatory damages.692  The court was foreclosed from applying
the new statutory standard for setting punitive damages693 because
the new damages statute applied only to cases arising after its
effective date.694
In Malabed v. North Slope Borough,695 the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska found that Malabed
successfully challenged the North Slope Borough’s (“NSB”)
employment policy preferring Native Americans.696  Malabed, a
683. See id.
684. See id.
685. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
686. Veco, 970 P.2d at 913 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 76-77).
687. 971 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1999).
688. 970 P.2d 906 (Alaska 1999).
689. See Norcon, 971 P.2d at 161.
690. Id. at 173.
691. See id. at 174.
692. See id. at 176-77.
693. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(c) (LEXIS 1998).
694. See Norcon, 971 P.2d at 175.
695. 42 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D. Alaska 1999).
696. See id. at 927.
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Filipino, was denied equal employment apparently on the basis of
being non-Native American.697  NSB relied on an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission opinion letter stating that
an exemption in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, allowing
employment preferences for Indians living on or near reservations,
applied to the NSB.698  The court applied the United States
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government699 in holding that the land in question was not a
federally defined reservation and thus not eligible for the
exemption.700  Additionally, the NSB’s charter prohibiting
employment preference based on national origin applied to policies
affecting Native Americans.701  Finally, the court held that the
policy did not withstand strict scrutiny equal protection analysis,
absent particularized evidence that the NSB had discriminated
against Native Americans in the past.702
B. Labor Law
In International Association of Firefighters, Local 1264 v.
Municipality of Anchorage,703 the supreme court held that an
interest arbitration clause was a nonmandatory subject of
bargaining and that the International Association of Firefighters
committed an unfair labor practice by insisting on bargaining over
the clause.704  Employers are required to bargain in good faith on
“subjects involving wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.”705  All other topics are considered permissive
bargaining subjects, and employers are not required to bring them
to the bargaining table.706  Because interest arbitration does not
directly affect an employee’s relationship with the employer in the
workplace, it is not considered a mandatory subject of bargaining.707
In University of Alaska Classified Employees Association,
APEA/AFT v. University of Alaska,708 the supreme court held that
the superior court was correct in granting summary judgment to
697. See id. at 929.
698. See id. at 928.
699. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
700. See Malabed, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 932.
701. See id. at 930-31.
702. See id. at 941.
703. 971 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1999).
704. See id.
705. Id. at 157.
706. See id.
707. See id.
708. 988 P.2d 105 (Alaska 1999).
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the university on the union’s claim that the university violated a
collective bargaining agreement by not implementing pay
increases.709  Although the university and the union had entered
into a collective bargaining agreement requiring yearly cost-of-
living salary adjustments, the adjustments were contingent on
legislative appropriation of the funds and the legislature had not
appropriated the funds for that year.710  Further, Alaska Statutes
section 23.40.215(a) requires that the monetary terms of a
bargaining agreement be subject to legislative appropriation.711
In Abbott v. State,712 the supreme court held that the federal
equitable tolling doctrine allowed an injured seaman to avoid a
statute of limitations bar on an injury claim.713  Abbott was injured
while working on a ship but did not pursue traditional maritime
remedies because her union’s collective bargaining agreement
provided ample benefits.714  In 1991, the supreme court held that a
similar collective bargaining agreement could not provide benefits
in lieu of traditional maritime remedies,715 and Abbott’s collective
bargaining benefits subsequently ceased.716  She then sought
traditional remedies, but lower courts found that these were
foreclosed to her because the three-year statute of limitations on
maritime torts had passed.717  The supreme court determined that
Abbott was entitled to an extension under the federal precedent of
“equitable tolling,” because “the plaintiff, by exercising reasonable
diligence, could not have discovered essential information bearing
on his or her claim.”718
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local
Union 547 v. Lindgren,719 the supreme court held that the
appropriate measure of damages for Lindgren, a former employee
of the city of Fairbanks, was the amount of attorney’s fees he
incurred in pursuing his claims against the city.720  The court held
that the union could not be charged with the attorney’s fees that
were allowable to Lindgren’s punitive damages claim under the
709. See id. at 106.
710. See id.
711. See id. at 107-08.
712. 979 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1999).
713. See id. at 998.
714. See id. at 995.
715. See id. (citing Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 1368 (Alaska 1991)).
716. See id.
717. See id. at 996.
718. Id. at 998.
719. 985 P.2d 451 (Alaska 1999).
720. See id. at 455.
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Whistleblower Act.721  The court remanded to litigate the issue of
whether Lindgren’s settlement of his claims against the city had
been fully compensatory.722  Specifically, the question on remand
was “whether lost income after reinstatement was offered and
declined would have been a remedy available to Lindgren under
the collective bargaining agreement.”723  The court further held that
there was no need to apportion damages between the city and the
union.724  Alaska law, unlike federal law, does not require the
employee to prove a breach of duty of fair representation before
proceeding against the employer.725
C. Workers’ Compensation
In Aleck v. Delvo Plastics, Inc.,726 the supreme court reversed a
Workers’ Compensation Board determination that an employee’s
claim for additional benefits was time-barred because it did not fall
within the latent injury exception to the statute of limitations for
bringing new claims.727  Aleck filed an Application for Adjustment
of Claim in November 1995, claiming she was experiencing new
pain symptoms related to a work injury for which she had been
compensated in 1973.  The Board denied Aleck’s application,
ruling that her new injury was not latent because she should have
known the relationship of this injury to her employment.728  The
Board concluded that because a doctor had warned Aleck in the
1970’s that her disability could worsen, she should have sought
regular medical attention to track the injury’s progress.729  The
supreme court rejected the Board’s reasoning, however, because
the employer did not present any evidence to contradict Aleck’s
assertions that her pain symptoms suddenly worsened, nor did the
employer present any case law which suggested that Aleck must
periodically visit a doctor in order to track an injury’s progress
even when there is no change in symptoms.730
In Seville v. Holland America Line Westours, Inc.,731 the
supreme court held that if an employer was required to keep the
721. See id. at 459; see also ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.120(a) (LEXIS 1999).
722. See Lindgren, 985 P.2d at 459.
723. Id. at 458.
724. See id.
725. See id. at 456.
726. 972 P.2d 988 (Alaska 1999).
727. See id. at 989.
728. See id. at 991.
729. See id. at 992.
730. See id.
731. 977 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1999).
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sidewalk outside its place of business free of ice, an injury to an
employee who slipped on ice was work-related and therefore
covered by worker’s compensation benefits.732  Although the
sidewalk could not be considered an actual part of the defendant’s
premises, traversing the sidewalk was a condition of Seville’s
employment and therefore covered by an exception to the going
and coming rule.733  Specifically, the court held that “when the
hazard results in an injury to a worker who is coming to work or
going home, ‘there is a distinct ‘arising out of’ or causal connection’
to the course of employment.”734  The court emphasized that this
ruling was “narrowly confined to the workers’ compensation
context, where compensability hinges on work-relatedness arising
from the existence of a duty, rather than on a breach of the duty or
a determination that the duty is owed to any particular
individual. . . .”735
In Malone v. Lake and Peninsula Borough School District,736
the court of appeals held that injuries sustained while traveling to a
place of prospective employment were not valid workers’
compensation claims.737  Mr. and Mrs. Malone were told by a school
official that they were likely to be employed to work as teachers in
a remote fishing village.738  Excited to visit the school, the Malones
ignored warnings about poor travel conditions from school officials
and others and flew out to the school.739  Mrs. Malone was injured
en route, and Mr. Malone was killed.740  Although the court was
willing to assume that there was an employment contract, it would
not award workers’ compensation because it held that the Malones
were not injured in the course of employment.741 It was not
foreseeable to the employer school board that the Malones would
visit before they were to begin teaching.742
In Lindekugel v. George Easley Co.,743 the supreme court held
that claimants are not barred from pursuing subsequent additional
benefits even once they have received lifetime personal disability
732. See id. at 105.
733. See id. at 107.
734. Id. at 109 (citing LARSON, LARSON’S WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW §
15.15, at 4-72 to 4-73 (1998)).
735. Id. at 111-12.
736. 977 P.2d 733 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999).
737. See id. at 736.
738. See id.
739. See id.
740. See id.
741. See id. at 738.
742. See id.
743. 986 P.2d 877 (Alaska 1999).
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benefits.744  Lindekugel was deemed permanently and totally
disabled after an injury at work in 1976 and received benefits for
permanent disability.745  He retired, relying on these benefits and on
social security, until two years later when the social security
administration determined he could return to work in a lessened
capacity and terminated his benefits.746  After a week with a new
employer, Lindekugel injured himself at work and became
permanently and totally disabled.747  The Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board denied benefits for the new injury on the
ground that a claimant cannot seek additional benefits after
receiving lifetime benefits for a permanent disability.748
The supreme court disagreed, noting that a disability is an
inability to “earn the wages which the employee was receiving at
the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.”749
Thus, the consideration is earning capacity, not physical
impairment.750  The central policy of the rule is that a worker can
regain earning capacity by “education or vocational
rehabilitation.”751  Thus, a classification of permanently and totally
disabled is not immutable, and a worker may make claims even
after receiving lifetime benefits.752
In Phillip Weidner & Assocs. v. Hibdon,753 the supreme court
held that the Workers’ Compensation Board wrongfully interfered
with a reasonable treatment decision by Hibdon and her
physician.754  Hibdon injured her back while on the job in 1993.755
Hibdon’s physician, Dr. Garner, suggested surgery, but the
insurance company refused to pay.756  Hibdon’s pain persisted after
a year-and-a-half of rehabilitative therapy, and Dr. Garner again
recommended surgery.757  After the insurance company’s physician
again advised that therapy would be the correct treatment, Hibdon
filed an application for adjustment with the Board.758  The supreme
744. See id. at 878.
745. See id.
746. See id.
747. See id.
748. See id. at 879.
749. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(10) (LEXIS 1998)).
750. See Lindekugel, 986 P.2d at 879.
751. Id.
752. See id. at 880.
753. 989 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999).
754. See id. at 733.
755. See id. at 728.
756. See id. at 729.
757. See id. at 729-30.
758. See id. at 730.
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court noted that Hibdon filed her claim within two years of her
injury, requiring the Board to apply a reasonableness of requested
treatment standard, rather than its own discretion among
reasonable alternatives.759  At the hearing, the insurer’s doctors
neither disputed Dr. Garner’s diagnosis nor the general efficacy of
the proposed treatment.760  Rather, they insisted on additional
testing and argued that Hibdon was not fit for the proposed
surgery.761  The supreme court noted that “where a claimant
receives conflicting medical advice, the claimant may choose to
follow his or her own doctor’s advice, so long as the choice of
treatment is reasonable.”762  Accordingly, the Board had incorrectly
dismissed Dr. Garner’s testimony and Hibdon had met her burden
of establishing the reasonableness of surgery as a treatment.763
In Bockness v. Brown Jug, Inc.,764 the supreme court held that
under the Workers’ Compensation Act, employers need only pay
reasonable and necessary treatment expenses of injured
employees.765  Bockness injured his back and received
“controversial” injection therapy and chiropractic treatments.766
His employer medically examined him and refused to pay for some
of the treatment, which it deemed unnecessary and too frequently
administered.767  The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board agreed
with the employer that the employer was only required to
compensate for necessary treatment.768 The supreme court found
that the Workers’ Compensation Act implicitly required employers
to compensate only for treatment reasonable and necessary to
recovery.769 Because the Board used substantial evidence to find
that the treatment was more frequent than needed, its finding was
appropriate.770
In Bolieu v. Our Lady of Compassion Care Center,771 the
supreme court held that the state Workers’ Compensation Board
inquired too narrowly as to whether two employees’ injuries were
759. See id. at 731.
760. See id. at 733.
761. See id.
762. Id. at 732.
763. See id. at 733.
764. 980 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1999).
765. See id. at 466.
766. See id.
767. See id.
768. See id. at 465.
769. See id. at 466.
770. See id. at 467.
771. 983 P.2d 1270 (Alaska 1999).
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work-related.772  The employees developed skin rashes that were
diagnosed as Staph A infections by two independent physicians.773
The Board denied the employees’ claims when it could not find a
sufficient legal connection between the Staph A infections and the
workplace.774  The court held that the Board’s error in failing to
address other possible work-related causes of the employees’
rashes was not harmless and remanded the case for
redetermination.775
In Robles v. Providence Hospital,776 the supreme court held
that the superior court improperly remanded a workers’
compensation case to the Workers’ Compensation Board for a
second time where the Board properly interpreted and acted upon
the original remand order.777  The superior court originally
remanded the case to the Board when it found insufficient
evidence upon which to base a decision against compensability.778
The Board reversed the unsupported finding and awarded benefits
to Robles.779  Defendant appealed to the superior court, arguing the
Board should have heard additional evidence; the superior court
remanded the case for further findings of fact.780  The supreme
court held that the superior court lacked the authority to remand
when an employee is presumed compensable and an appellate
court finds no substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding
against compensability.781
D. Miscellaneous
In Era Aviation, Inc. v. Seekins,782 the supreme court held that
an employer did not violate the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing when it fired an at-will employee because of a
personality conflict.783  The covenant works only to effectuate the
reasonable expectations of the parties and to prevent the employer
from firing the employee to further an impermissible motive or
772. See id. at 1272.
773. See id.
774. See id. at 1273.
775. See id. at 1280.
776. 988 P.2d 592 (Alaska 1999).
777. See id. at 593.
778. See id. at 596.
779. See id. at 597.
780. See id.
781. See id.
782. 973 P.2d 1137 (Alaska 1999).
783. See id. at 1141.
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objective.784  The supreme court ruled that using the covenant to
convert at-will employment into good-cause employment would
impermissibly alter the basic character of the employment
agreement, and that the employer’s alleged desire to avoid a
personality conflict between two employees was a permissible
motive for firing Seekins.785
In Holland v. Union Oil Co. of California, Inc.,786 the supreme
court held that a memo addressing potential behavior problems,
prohibiting certain conduct, and stating possible consequences did
not modify an “at-will” employment agreement to one “for
cause.”787  In addition, the employer did not breach the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in demoting the employee.788  Holland
was an employee of Union Oil and discussed doing work for one of
Union Oil’s contractors while on the company’s premises.789
Holland admitted to having the discussion, but denied having any
intent to go through with the work.790  Holland’s supervisor then
demoted Holland, reducing Holland’s annual salary by
approximately $20,000.791  The supreme court rejected Holland’s
assertion that the company improperly demoted him without
cause.792  The supreme court stated that a memo distributed by
Union Oil which discussed prohibited behavior and possible
consequences, but contained hedging terms such as “can result,”
“[i]n most instances,” and “steps in the progressive discipline
system may be bypassed,” did not create a reasonable expectation
that employees were granted certain rights.793
The supreme court then rejected Holland’s assertions that
Unocal breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.794
Holland claimed he was treated differently than other employees
because he was punished for “thinking about” doing the same thing
that other employees did.795  However, the projects and incidences
that Holland referred to cost about $150, while Holland’s project
would have cost approximately $8,000-$10,000 and were therefore,
784. See id.
785. See id.
786. 993 P.2d 1026 (Alaska 1999).
787. See id. at 1032.
788. See id.
789. See id. at 1028.
790. See id.
791. See id.
792. See id. at 1030.
793. Id. at 1032.
794. See id.
795. See id. at 1033.
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not the same.796  Furthermore, Holland’s claim that he had no
intention of doing the work was a fact disputed by Union Oil who
determined otherwise after a good faith investigation of the facts.797
An employer has not breached the covenant of good faith if it
makes a good faith but incorrect determination that misconduct
occurred.798
In Tolbert v. Alascom, Inc.,799 the supreme court held that a
worker who showed a preliminary link between an injury and her
job was entitled to compensation because her employer failed to
overcome the presumption in favor of employees.800  However, the
supreme court also held that the “presumption of compensability”
did not apply to the establishment of medical expenses.801  Tolbert,
who claimed to have sustained hand injuries, established the
preliminary link between the injury and her work.802  Alascom
failed to overcome the presumption of compensability because the
evidence it presented did not rule out Tolbert’s work as a cause for
her injury, and Alascom failed to show an alternative probable
cause of her injury.803  However, Tolbert could not collect for
medical expenses for which she had no records.804
In Chijide v. Manilaq Association of Kotzebue,805 the supreme
court held that an employee with a year-to-year employment
contract that the employer could decline to renew for any reason
did not have a property interest in the renewal of the contract
because the employee had “no legitimate expectation” of indefinite
employment.806  Chijide argued that she was denied due process
because the hospital decided to end her employment without giving
her notice or a hearing.807  The supreme court rejected that
argument, noting that Storrs v. Lutheran Hospitals & Homes
796. See id. at 1034.
797. See id. at 1035.
798. See id.
799. 973 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1999).
800. See id. at 611.
801. See id. at 607.
802. See id. at 610.
803. See id. at 611.
804. See id. at 608.
805. 972 P.2d 167 (Alaska 1999).
806. Id. at 171.
807. See id. at 170.
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Society of America808 does not entitle all doctors terminated by
quasi-public hospitals to a hearing.809
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Shook,810 the supreme court
held that a terminated employee’s separation agreement released
Alyeska Pipeline from all claims arising from that employment.811
Further, the court decided that an employee did not violate the
Alaska Wage and Hour Act, under which an employee may not
privately settle a wage and hour claim for less than the damages
required in the Act,812 when that employee received a severance
package in excess of the Act’s requirements.813  When Shook was
released from employment with Alyeska Pipeline, he received a
$141,496.73 severance payment in consideration for signing a
general release of liability for any claims against Alyeska arising
out of his employment.814  Soon afterwards, he sued Alyeska
alleging unpaid overtime.815  The court, pointing to the broad
language of the agreement and the court’s policy of interpreting
contracts to effectuate the “reasonable expectations of the parties,”
concluded that the severance payment was consideration for any
AWHA claim Shook had.816  In dicta, the court commented that it
would possibly have found an exception had Shook reserved
AWHA claims, or had the contract violated public safety.817  Since
the severance package far exceeded the claim mandated by the
AWHA, however, no public policy was offended when Shook
accepted payment as a release of liability from employment
claims.818
In Brassea v. Person,819 the supreme court held that Brassea, a
seaman, was “in the service of the ship” when a hernia sustained on
the job yielded a second hernia seemingly unrelated to Brassea’s
employment.820  The initial injury occurred while Brassea was lifting
808. 609 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1980)(holding that when a quasi-public hospital that is
the only hospital in a given location terminates a doctor’s hospital privileges, it
must give the doctor notice and a hearing prior to terminating those privileges).
809. See Chijide, 972 P.2d at 171.
810. 978 P.2d 86 (Alaska 1999).
811. See id. at 88.
812. See id. at 87.
813. See id. at 91.
814. See id. at 87.
815. See id.
816. Id. at 89-90.
817. See id.
818. See id. at 91.
819. 985 P.2d 481 (Alaska 1999).
820. Id. at 484-85.
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a gas tank, incident to his employment.821  While performing
surgery to repair this hernia, the doctor discovered a second,
unrelated hernia and performed a second surgery to repair it.822
According to the court, Brassea’s “injury, and subsequent surgery,
were incidents of his position as a seaman and closely related to the
business of the ship.”823  The court further found a “pervasive”
tradition of interpreting liberally the owner of a ship’s liability in
cases of maintenance and cure.824  Thus, Brassea was found to be
“in the service of the ship” at the time he required surgery for the
second hernia.825
In Henash v. Ipalook,826 the supreme court upheld the superior
court’s finding that Ipalook’s position was not overtime-exempt,
but found error in the superior court’s failure to use the parties’
stipulated pay rate in calculating damages.827  Ipalook had been
hired into an overtime-exempt managerial position, but was never
given actual supervisory status in the course of her job.828  As part
of her position, Ipalook had to be on call twenty-four hours a day.829
Given the facts presented at trial, the superior court did not err in
finding that Ipalook’s position was not supervisory and she was
therefore entitled to overtime.830  The supreme court remanded for
a determination of the amount of damages because the court failed
to use the stipulated hourly rate in its calculation.831
In Alaska State Employees’ Association/AFSCME Local 52 v.
State,832 the supreme court affirmed the Alaska Labor Relations
Agency’s (“ALRA”) reclassification of three state positions as
supervisory.833  The reclassification affected the membership of the
union representing non-supervisory state employees.834  The
supreme court reviewed the ALRA’s actions deferentially, testing
(1) whether the agency has a grant of authority to make
regulations, (2) whether the regulations are “consistent with and
reasonably necessary” to further the statute, and (3) whether the
821. See id. at 482.
822. See id. at 481.
823. Id.
824. See id. at 485.
825. Id. at 484.
826. 985 P.2d 442 (Alaska 1999).
827. See id. at 451.
828. See id. at 444.
829. See id.
830. See id. at 443.
831. See id. at 450.
832. 990 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1999).
833. See id.
834. See id. at 17.
YIR.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:17 AM
228 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [17:1
regulations are “reasonable and not arbitrary.”835  The court
concluded the regulation in this case was consistent with the
ALRA’s rulemaking authority, and it worked well with the
“community of interest test,”836 requiring employees with
theoretical supervisory power to be treated as supervisors.837  The
new regulation merely clarified the statute.838
In Stone v. Fluid Air Components of Alaska,839 the supreme
court held that “the employer’s pro rata share of fees and costs
should be based on both past and future benefits to the
employer.”840  Stone was injured at his place of employment and
received worker’s compensation from Fluid Air Components of
Alaska.841  Stone later received a third-party judgment for his tort
claim arising from the injury.842  Fluid Air petitioned for a
reimbursement on its prior payments to Stone, arguing that the
statutory scheme in Alaska, in contrast with other jurisdictions,
“does not include the right to future reimbursement on the part of
the employer.”843  The court concluded that this remedy squares
with the text of Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015(g), which allows
for the deduction of litigation costs prior to an insured person’s
reimbursement of his employer.844  Therefore, the employer’s pro
rata share of the litigation costs must be based on the past and
future benefits to the employee.845
VIII.  FAMILY LAW
A. Child Support
In Brown v. Brown,846 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
child support obligation may be fulfilled by depositing money in a
trust fund to benefit a child, instead of sending money directly to
the custodial parent.847  Further, the court held that the non-
custodial parent breached the divorce decree by failing to deposit
835. Id. at 18.
836. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.090 (LEXIS 1998).
837. Alaska State Employees’ Ass’n,  990 P.2d at 19.
838. See id.
839. 990 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1999).
840. Id. at 624.
841. See id. at 621.
842. See id.
843. Id. at 623.
844. See id.
845. See id. at 624.
846. 983 P.2d 1264 (Alaska 1999).
847. See id. at 1268.
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money into the trust fund.848  The breach gave the superior court
the power to alter the original decree to ensure that the child
would receive appropriate support.849  The supreme court also
agreed with the superior court that the Child Support Enforcement
Division (“CSED”) has authority to collect the child support
arrears at statutory interest levels.850  The court reiterated its
holding in In re Adoption of K.M.M. and B.M.M.851 that proper
maintenance of a trust fund fulfills, but does not replace, a child
support obligation.852
In Scully v. Scully,853 the supreme court addressed a question
that arose after the Alaska legislature amended Alaska Statutes
section 25.24.170(a) to permit trial courts to extend child support
for children who have reached the age of eighteen, but who are still
living at home and are attending high school.854  The court
affirmatively concluded that “this change in the law constitutes a
change in circumstances permitting modification and extension of
existing child support orders entered before the legislature’s
action.”855  Thus, the court declared, “as long as an eighteen-year-
old child meets [the] statutory conditions, a custodial parent may
move for continued child support.”856
In Rusenstrom v. Rusenstrom,857 the supreme court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Allan Rusenstrom’s
motion for credit against his child support obligation.858
Rusenstrom provided health insurance for his children, then
attempted to credit it against his child support obligation.859
Rusenstrom paid for the health insurance through a deduction
from his employer’s contribution to his retirement plan.860  This loss
to his “income stream” was functionally equivalent to his paying
cash and, therefore, could be credited against his child support
obligation.861
848. See id.
849. See id. at 1268-69.
850. See id. at 1270.
851. 611 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1980).
852. See Brown, 983 P.2d at 1268.
853. 987 P.2d 743 (Alaska 1999) (consolidating appeals in Scully v. Scully).
854. See id. at 744.
855. Id.
856. Id. at 745.
857. 981 P.2d 558 (Alaska 1999).
858. See id. at 559.
859. See id.
860. See id. at 562.
861. Id.
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In State v. Kovac,862 the supreme court held that Kovac, the
biological father of R.M., owed child support from the date R.M.
was born, not from the date the presumed father’s paternity was
disestablished.863  Furthermore, Kovac, by virtue of an estoppel
claim, could not bring a paternity suit against Romer, the presumed
father.864  The court reasoned that even if the biological father
could bring such a suit, Kovac’s claim would fail on the ground that
the presumed father and child had a close relationship and that the
child had come to accept the presumed father as his true father,
Kovac’s claim would fail.865  The court had previously narrowed the
scope of this defense in equity by holding that paternity by estoppel
applies only when there is proof of economic reliance.866  It is not
enough to risk emotional harm in severing a child’s relationship
with a parent.867  Kovac failed to show that potential economic
detriment to R.M. or his mother would result from severing R.M’s
relationship with his presumed father.868
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. Bromley,869 the
supreme court held that CSED had authority to modify another
state’s child support obligation under certain conditions.870
Bromley divorced his wife in Maine, after which he moved to
Alaska and his child and former wife moved to Pennsylvania.871
Maine issued the child support obligation.872  In 1992, Pennsylvania
asked CSED to impose a child support order on Bromley.873
Bromley waived his right to appeal and began to make the CSED
payments.874  Three years later, Bromley registered and CSED
accepted the Maine support order, which had lower child support
payments.875  CSED refused, however, to restore the amounts in
862. 984 P.2d 1109 (Alaska 1999).
863. See id. at 1112.
864. See id.
865. See id. at 1113.
866. See id.
867. See id; see also B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999) (overturning
prior case law and holding that the paternity by estoppel doctrine may be invoked
only upon a showing of economic, rather than emotional, prejudice).
868. See Kovac, 984 P.2d at 1113.
869. 987 P.2d 183 (Alaska 1999).
870. See id. at 185.
871. See id.
872. See id.
873. See id.
874. See id. at 186.
875. See id.
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excess of the Maine order that Bromley had paid while under the
CSED obligation.876
The supreme court first determined that CSED did have
subject matter jurisdiction to establish a child support order,
although the Maine order already existed.877  The court also
concluded that, although the child was in Pennsylvania, Alaska law
controlled Bromley’s child support obligation, because the obligee
and the obligor did not live in the issuing state, the petitioner
seeking modification was not a resident of Alaska, and the
respondent was subject to Alaska’s personal jurisdiction.878  The
supreme court also upheld CSED’s child support order by
determining that the lower court erred in departing from Rule
90.3(a).879  Rules of finality preclude a Rule 90 adjustment until the
movant shows a material change of circumstances.880  The supreme
court defined Bromley’s claim of past overpayment as a collateral
attack on the 1993 order, rather than a material change of
circumstance.881
In Dewey v. Dewey,882 the supreme court held that the superior
court had subject matter jurisdiction and properly increased
Michael Dewey’s child support obligation pursuant to Civil Rule
90.3.883  The court also held that Michael’s request for relief due to
mistake was time-barred by Rule 60(b)(1).884  Michael claimed the
superior court lacked jurisdiction to order him to pay child support
because the child was not his biologically nor through adoption.885
The supreme court held that the superior court’s jurisdiction was
not an abuse of discretion because Michael voluntarily agreed to
provide child support.886  Michael further claimed that conventional
child support modification procedures under Rule 90.3, established
in 1987, should not apply to him because his contractual agreement
to support the child was entered into in 1985.887  The supreme court
held that Michael’s support agreement was intended to provide the
child with an amount necessary for her care, subject to his ability to
876. See id.
877. See id.
878. See id. at 189 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.25.611(b) (LEXIS 1998)).
879. See id. at 191 (citing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3).
880. See id. at 193.
881. See id.
882. 969 P.2d 1154 (Alaska 1999).
883. See id. at 1161.
884. See id. at 1159.
885. See id. at 1160.
886. See id. at 1161.
887. See id. at 1157.
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pay.888  Therefore, Michael’s monthly payment could be increased
within the comprehensive scope of Rule 90.3.889  Finally, Michael
claimed he was entitled to equitable relief because there had been
a mistake as to his obligation to provide support.890  The supreme
court held that Rule 60(b)(1), which time-bars relief due to mistake
after one year, prevented Michael from arguing the issue of
mistake.891
In Rubright v. Arnold,892 the supreme court held Rubright
liable for child support for his biological child, even though the
lower court determined Rubright’s paternity through an
establishment order when he failed to comply with discovery.893
Rubright fathered Mrs. Arnold’s third child while she was still
living with her husband.894  The child was declared Mr. Arnold’s son
at birth and treated as such until Mr. Arnold determined he was
not the father, at which point the couple separated.895  At trial,
Rubright repeatedly violated discovery by failing to submit blood
tests; consequently, the court granted a declaratory motion stating
that Rubright was the father.896  The supreme court determined that
this was not error because establishment orders are justified when
there is a willful failure to comply with discovery.897  On the merits,
the order was acceptable because Mrs. Arnold made a prima facie
showing of Rubright’s paternity, which was not rebutted.898
The supreme court also rejected Rubright’s argument that
Mrs. Arnold was estopped from denying Mr. Arnold’s paternity,
because she had made no representation to Rubright.899  Equitable
estoppel requires representation of a position that is relied on in
such a way as to prejudice the claiming party.900
In Vinzant v. Elam,901 the supreme court held that the superior
court’s modification of a custody order at a show-cause hearing
violated due process and that the superior court abused its
888. See id. at 1158.
889. See id. at 1159.
890. See id.
891. See id.
892. 973 P.2d 580 (Alaska 1999).
893. See id. at 583.
894. See id. at 581.
895. See id.
896. See id. at 583.
897. See id.
898. See id. at 584.
899. See id.
900. See id.
901. 977 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1999).
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discretion when it denied a motion to recalculate child support.902
The mother filed a motion with the court alleging that the father,
who had primary custody, was frustrating her visitation rights.903
The court ordered a show-cause hearing at which it modified the
child custody order without notifying the parties that custody was
at issue.904  The custody modification at the show-cause hearing
violated due process because it did not address the statutory factors
relevant to the child’s best interest.905  The supreme court also held
that a parent is obligated to support his or her children regardless
of a support order, so the superior court abused its discretion by
denying the father’s motion to recalculate child support when he
gained primary custody.906
In Ferguson v. State,907 the supreme court held that a father
who obtains relief from paternity and future support payments
under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(5) is still liable for support
arrearages accrued before paternity was disestablished.908  Ferguson
sought relief from support arrearages based on his successful
paternity challenge.909  The supreme court denied relief, holding
that Rule 60(b)(5), by its own terms, only provides for prospective
relief.910
In State v. Dillon,911 the supreme court held that “[u]nder
Alaska Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2), a revised child support order
presumptively relates back to notice of a petition for modification,”
but that good cause may allow for a later effective date.912  CSED
appealed a superior court order altering Dillon’s child support
payment, because the payment was not made effective back to the
date Dillon received the Notice of the Petition for Modification.913
The supreme court held that the superior court had not shown
good cause why it chose not to extend the effective date back to the
month following Dillon’s receipt of notice, and therefore the
superior court abused its discretion in failing to make its order
effective back to the date Dillon received the notice.914
902. See id. at 87-88.
903. See id.
904. See id.
905. See id. at 87.
906. See id. at 88.
907. 977 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1999).
908. See id. at 103.
909. See id. at 97.
910. See id. at 99.
911. 977 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1999).
912. Id.
913. See id. at 119.
914. See id. at 120.
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In Koss v. Koss,915 the supreme court held that the ten-year
statute of limitations contained in Alaska Statutes section 09.10.040
did not bar CSED from administratively enforcing child support
judgments that were twelve years old.916  In 1997, Koss sought to
enjoin CSED from using its administrative powers to enforce
judgments from 1982 and 1985.917  The supreme court, however,
characterized CSED’s enforcement powers as more like standard
judicial execution rather than beginning new legal proceedings.918
Therefore, CSED’s collection of child support judgments are not
actions upon a judgment, but simply enforcement of an outstanding
judgment, and are not governed by section 09.10.040.919
In State v. Green,920 the supreme court held that a direct lump-
sum pre-payment for court-ordered child support did not relieve an
obligor of his responsibility to reimburse the state for future
support provided through the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (“AFDC”) program.921  Green paid the mother of his
minor child $54,000 for past and future child support in exchange
for relief from any future claims for child support.922  Eventually,
the mother applied for and began receiving AFDC benefits and
CSED sought reimbursement from the father, who claimed his
agreement with the mother released him from such claims.923  The
court held that “[b]y paying directly, he took the chance [that the
mother] might again receive assistance someday, thus exposing
Green to additional liability. . . .”924  Further, the court held that the
“prepayment . . . could not discharge a future obligation Green
might have to the state.”925
In State v. Schofield,926 the supreme court held that a trial
court’s judgment was a prohibited retroactive modification of the
defendant’s child support obligation when it reduced the obligation
during the state’s motion to convert defendant’s support arrearages
to judgment.927  The defendant had a long history of non-payment
and under-payment of child support, and the state moved to have
915. 981 P.2d 106 (Alaska 1999).
916. See id. at 109.
917. See id. at 106.
918. See id. at 108.
919. See id. at 109.
920. 983 P.2d 1249 (Alaska 1999).
921. See id. at 1257.
922. See id. at 1251.
923. See id. at 1252.
924. Id. at 1257.
925. Id.
926. 993 P.2d 405 (Alaska 1999).
927. See id. at 407.
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these deficiencies reduced to judgment.928  The state calculated the
defendant’s arrearages based on a monthly support payment that
differed from the original support order.929  The superior court
entered judgment based on the defendant’s figure, which differed
from the original order and the state’s figure, and the state
appealed.930  The supreme court held that under former Alaska
Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(h)(2), a trial judge may reduce child
support arrearages only on a motion for modification of support
arrearages.931  Since the trial judge in this case modified the
arrearages on a motion for judgment and not on a motion for
modification, the trial judge violated Rule 90.3(h)(2), and the
judgment was erroneous.932
B. Child Custody
In John v. Baker,933 the supreme court decided that tribes have
a sovereign and inherent power to decide child custody disputes
between Native Americans in their own courts.934  John and Baker
had never married, but had two children and lived in a Native
American village.935  Upon the dissolution of the relationship,
Baker petitioned the state trial court for sole custody.936  John filed
a motion to dismiss, pointing out that the action had already
commenced in the tribal courts.937  The trial court denied the
motion, ruling it had “subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.”938
The supreme court held that tribes have a sovereign and inherent
power to decide child custody disputes between Native Americans
in tribal courts.939  The court considered such jurisdiction to be
concurrent with state court jurisdiction.940
In Jensen v. Froissart,941 the supreme court held that the trial
court properly corrected its judgment under Alaska Civil Rule
928. See id.
929. See id.
930. See id.
931. See id. at 408.
932. See id. at 409.
933. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
934. See id. at 742.
935. See id.
936. See id.
937. See id.
938. Id.
939. See id.
940. See id. at 764.
941. 982 P.2d 263 (Alaska 1999) .
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60(a) when a clerical error was made in a child custody decree.942
In 1995, the trial court ordered Jensen to pay $3,194, “plus
interest,” to Froissart for medical expenses incurred in 1989 on
behalf of their child.943  The order did not specify a starting date for
the interest.944  In 1996, Froissart successfully moved the trial court
to amend its judgment to specify that interest accrued from 1989.945
Jensen appealed the amended judgment.946  The supreme court held
that correcting the disputed omission entailed no factual findings or
legal conclusions beyond those made to support the trial court’s
original judgment.947  Accordingly, the superior court could correct
the judgment’s omission pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 60(a).948
In Harrington v. Jordan,949 the supreme court held that a
husband did not show a substantial change in circumstances and
was therefore not entitled to a custody modification hearing.950
Harrington requested a hearing on custody modification.951  As
justification for the hearing, Harrington cited one daughter’s
visitation of more than 110 overnight visits, Jordan’s behavior that
made visitation difficult, and the daughters’ decreased need to be
together.952  The supreme court noted that the increased number of
overnight visits was due to a special visitation agreement made by
the parties and the court to accommodate a family trip.953  Because
the special visitation was not likely to be repeated, it was not a
substantial change justifying a modification hearing.954  The court
also concluded that Harrington’s allegation that Jordan made
visitation difficult was limited to one incident.955  Enforcement of
the current visitation order would be more appropriate than
modification.956  Finally, the court stated that the daughters’
allegedly decreased need to be with each other was not a
substantial change because the original visitation order was based
942. See id. at 265.
943. Id.
944. See id.
945. See id.
946. See id.
947. See id. at 269.
948. See id.
949. 984 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1999).
950. See id. at 4.
951. See id. at 3.
952. See id. at 3-4.
953. See id. at 3.
954. See id.
955. See id. at 4.
956. See id.
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on Harrington’s relationship with the daughters, not the daughters’
relationship with one another.957
In Park v. Park,958 the supreme court remanded a child custody
case for further consideration of all statutory factors for
determining the best interests of the child.959  The Parks divorced
after Michael Park discovered Tara Park’s infidelity.960  Michael
took the couple’s two children and resettled in Texas.961  Michael
was awarded interim custody and had the children for twenty
months before the issue of permanent custody was adjudicated.962
He was not cooperative, however, in allowing Tara to exercise her
visitation rights.963  Based upon the report of a custody investigator,
which focused exclusively on Michael’s refusal to accommodate
visitation rights, the trial court awarded Tara legal custody without
exploring whether Tara would be the more appropriate parent
through examination of all statutory considerations.964
According to the supreme court, the trial court’s “brevity,
their almost exclusive focus on a single statutory factor, and their
conclusionary adoption of the custody investigator’s
recommendations provide no assurance that the trial court
followed the thorough, deliberate reasoning process required
under AS 25.24.150(c).”965  The supreme court instructed the trial
court to allow each of the Parks to present more evidence and to
determine the best interests of the children.966
In Crane v. Crane,967 the supreme court enforced a custody
agreement over a father’s objections that the document
represented neither his nor his children’s interests and wishes.968
Mr. Crane argued that because his attorney erroneously advised
him that certain witnesses would not be allowed to testify, he was
more inclined to accept a settlement that he felt was not in his
children’s best interest.969  The supreme court found that the
agreement met minimal contractual requirements, and that it also
957. See id.
958. 986 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1999).
959. See id.
960. See id. at 206.
961. See id.
962. See id.
963. See id.
964. See id.
965. Id. at 210-11.
966. See id. at 211.
967. 986 P.2d 881 (Alaska 1999).
968. See id. at 883.
969. See id.
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satisfied the best interests of the children standard.970  The court
reasoned that the contracts resulting from parental cooperation
and a settlement are always in the child’s best interests.971  The
supreme court enforced the settlement in order not to deter future
settlements in similar cases by giving the appearance that
settlements will not be respected on appeal.972
In Naquin v. Naquin,973 the supreme court held that a former
husband who opposed a motion to modify a child custody order
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the motion was
granted.974  The superior court had granted the former wife’s
motion to modify child custody without a hearing because it found
“no material facts at issue.”975  The supreme court held that both
procedural due process under the Alaska Constitution and the
supreme court’s prior holdings provide a right to an evidentiary
hearing prior to the modification of a child custody order.976
In Morino v. Swayman,977 the supreme court held that long-
term informal changes to custodial or visitation arrangements
could constitute a “change in circumstances” under Alaska Statutes
section 25.20.110(a) and thus entitle a parent to an evidentiary
hearing.978  Morino, the divorced father of two children, brought
suit to modify the visitation arrangement after informally agreeing
for ten months with the children’s mother to keep the children for
three consecutive overnight visits, rather than two nights and a
mid-week visit.979  Although the supreme court acknowledged that
“[c]ustodial parents should have the flexibility to experiment with
new visitation schedules without fearing that every change could be
the basis for modifying visitation,” it determined that, “at some
point, informal or de facto modifications of custodial or visitation
rights should be formalized.”980
In Todd v. Todd,981 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not err in granting full physical and legal custody of K.T.,
the Todds’ minor child, to K.T.’s paternal grandparents.982  The
970. See id. at 885.
971. See id. at 889.
972. See id.
973. 974 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1999).
974. See id. at 384.
975. Id.
976. See id. at 384-85.
977. 970 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1999).
978. Id. at 429.
979. See id. at 428.
980. Id. at 429.
981. 989 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1999).
982. See id. at 145.
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standard applied in a custody battle between a parent and a non-
parent differs from the standard in proceedings between parents.983
Between parents, the standard is “the best interest of the child.”984
Between a parent and a non-parent, however, the parent will be
denied custody only if it is clearly detrimental for the child to be in
the parent’s custody.985  In this case, the court determined that
parental custody would be detrimental because K.T. spent the
majority of her life living with her paternal grandparents while her
father was in jail, where he remains, and her mother was in and out
of the child’s life.986
In V.D. v. State Department of Health and Social Services,987 the
supreme court overturned the superior court’s decision to deprive
V.D. of custody of her children.988  V.D. left her six children with
close friends in Alaska while she traveled to Florida to secure
employment and housing.989  When her friends’ funds became
depleted and they could no longer support the children without
state aid, they brought the children to the Department of Family
and Youth Services to request state assistance.990  The state
petitioned to take custody of the children, and the court granted
custody to the state.991  V.D. appealed on the ground that the trial
was skewed because it examined the children’s need to enter the
state’s care based on their situation eight months before the trial,
rather than at the time of the trial.992  The supreme court examined
the relevant statute,993 and determined that the lower court erred by
not looking at the facts at the time of trial to assess the need for
state intervention.994
C. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Marital Property
In Song v. Song,995 the supreme court held that the superior
court properly granted a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a marriage
983. See id. at 143.
984. Id.
985. See id.
986. See id. at 142.
987. 991 P.2d 214 (Alaska 1999).
988. See id. at 215.
989. See id.
990. See id.
991. See id.
992. See id. at 216.
993. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a) (LEXIS 2000).
994. See V.D., 991 P.2d at 217-18.
995. 972 P.2d 589 (Alaska 1999).
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dissolution agreement because of fraud.996  The court also held that
the superior court denied one party basic procedural fairness when
it treated a stipulated marriage dissolution as a divorce and
resolved property division issues without the consent of both
parties.997  The court reasoned that a claim of fraud in disclosing the
full value of marital assets and debts fits well within Rule 60(b)(3),
and because the superior court could properly resolve credibility
issues, it did not abuse its discretion in awarding relief under the
rule.998  The court further held that divorce decrees and dissolution
decrees are not interchangeable.999  Modification of a marriage
dissolution agreement in a dissolution proceeding can occur only
with the written consent of both parties.1000  The superior court, by
converting a previously stipulated marriage dissolution into a
divorce without affording both parties an opportunity to litigate
disputed property division issues, deprived one party of basic
procedural fairness.1001
In Jordan v. Jordan,1002 the supreme court held that a divorce
litigant with marital assets between $200,000 and $300,000 was not
indigent and that the superior court’s error in excluding expert
testimony in a child custody hearing was harmless.1003  Lucy Jordan,
an Alaska Native, sued Michael Jordan for divorce.1004  Michael
requested court-appointed counsel on the ground he was
indigent.1005  The supreme court stated that the superior court was
not clearly erroneous in denying the motion because Michael could
have liquidated marital assets without encumbering the family
home.1006
During a custody hearing, the superior court excluded
Michael’s experts’ testimony because the experts were neither
acquainted with Lucy nor experts of Native or Yupik culture.1007
The supreme court commented that during Indian child custody
hearings a court must allow expert testimony by professional
persons with substantial education in their specialty.1008  The court
996. See id. at 592.
997. See id. at 594.
998. See id. at 592.
999. See id. at 594.
1000. See id. at 593.
1001. See id. at 594.
1002. 983 P.2d 1258 (Alaska 1999).
1003. See id. at 1264.
1004. See id. at 1260.
1005. See id. at 1262.
1006. See id. at 1263.
1007. See id. at 1261.
1008. See id.
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concluded that the error of excluding the testimony was harmless,
however, because the proposed experts had no knowledge of
Lucy’s parental fitness nor the services available at the public
schools the child would attend if he lived with Lucy.1009  Thus, even
if the court had admitted the experts’ testimony, Michael would not
have met the burden imposed by the Indian Child Welfare Act to
remove the child from Lucy’s custody.1010
In Tybus v. Holland,1011 the supreme court held that the trial
court could award rehabilitative alimony to an employed spouse to
earn a second master’s degree.1012  The court upheld the trial court’s
determination that Holland sacrificed her career on several
occasions for the benefit of Tybus’s career.1013  When the couple
separated in 1996, Holland’s earning capacity was approximately
$32,000 per year, while Tybus was earning more than $65,000 per
year.1014  After separation, Holland incurred nearly $10,000 in
student loans to earn a master’s degree and developed a plan to
earn a master’s degree in business administration.1015  The supreme
court held that the trial court could properly have determined that
the loans were marital and that the second master’s degree was
necessary to increase Holland’s minimal earning capacity.1016
In Knutson v. Knutson,1017 the supreme court upheld the
superior court’s authority to interpret an ambiguous marriage
dissolution agreement.1018  The dissolution agreement, signed in
1988, stated that the parties agreed to postpone selling the marital
residence until its market value rose.1019  In 1997, the former
husband sought a court order to buy out the former wife’s interest
in the house.1020  The supreme court reversed the superior court’s
valuation and held that for purposes of valuing the debt on the
marital home, the 1997 value should be used.1021
In McGee v. McGee,1022 the supreme court held that a former
wife may move under Rule 60(b) to obtain relief from a marriage
1009. See id. at 1262.
1010. See id.
1011. 989 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1999).
1012. See id. at 1287-88.
1013. See id. at 1283.
1014. See id. at 1284.
1015. See id. at 1283.
1016. See id. at 1288.
1017. 973 P.2d 596 (Alaska 1999).
1018. See id. at 600.
1019. See id. at 598.
1020. See id.
1021. See id. at 603.
1022. 974 P.2d 983 (Alaska 1999).
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dissolution decree that did not address the issue of individual
fishing quotas.1023  The husband and wife were engaged in the
fishing industry from 1978 until their divorce in 1993.1024  Shortly
after the divorce, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued
individual fishing quotas to individuals who had fished in the
regulated waters between 1984 and 1990.1025  Both the former
husband and wife were entitled to the quotas, but the husband kept
the quotas for himself.1026  Although the quota system was not
instituted until after the dissolution of the marriage, the court
deemed the quotas marital property, because income and assets
received after the dissolution for activities performed during the
marriage constitute divisible marital property.1027
In Williams v. Crawford,1028 the supreme court held that federal
regulations prevented Camille McVey from being eligible as a
named beneficiary on her deceased ex-husband William’s civil
service pension survivorship benefits.1029  The McVeys included in
their divorce agreement a provision requiring William to name
Camille as a beneficiary to his pension benefits.1030  Camille
remarried before the age of fifty-five, however, and therefore
rendered herself statutorily ineligible to be named on the insurance
policies.1031  Despite this condition, the court granted Camille relief
in equity because her entitlement for the survivorship benefits was
assumed in the property division by both her and William.1032
Neither was aware of the federal regulations providing that Camille
would lose the benefit if she remarried before the age of fifty-
five.1033  Thus, equity demanded that Camille receive half of the
value of the marital portion of William’s civil service pension.1034
In Dixon v. Pouncy,1035 the supreme court held that the
superior court had abused its discretion when it denied an ex-
husband’s motion to set aside several divorce decree provisions
based on res judicata.1036  Dixon, the ex-husband, attempted to
1023. See id. at 986.
1024. See id.
1025. See id.
1026. See id.
1027. See id. at 988.
1028. 982 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1999).
1029. See id.
1030. See id. at 252.
1031. See id.
1032. See id. at 250.
1033. See id. at 252.
1034. See id.
1035. 979 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1999).
1036. See id. at 527.
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contest the portion of the divorce decree declaring him the father
of a child born during the marriage and ordering him to pay child
support.1037  This attempt followed a paternity test taken subsequent
to the divorce decree.1038  The superior court’s denial of Dixon’s
motion “was based solely on the ground that res judicata barred
him from litigating the issue of paternity,” because Dixon had had
the opportunity to litigate the matter of paternity in previous
proceedings.1039  The supreme court concluded that because res
judicata cannot bar a direct attack upon a judgment, it could not
bar Dixon’s direct attack on the divorce decree.1040
In Hammer v. Hammer,1041 the supreme court held that long-
term alimony was just and reasonable when one spouse was deaf,
had a much lower earning potential, and would have to care for a
child of the marriage.1042  The Hammers married in 1973 and
divorced in 1996.1043  Kathi Hammer had been deaf since infancy
and was capable of earning only about $15,000 annually.1044  Ken
Hammer’s gross annual income, by contrast, exceeded $95,000.1045
The superior court awarded Kathi custody of the Hammers’ minor
daughter.1046  The supreme court upheld the trial court’s finding that
long-term alimony was just and reasonable because Kathi would
care for the Hammers’ daughter and undergo job retraining, all
while coping with her deafness and other medical problems.1047
Because uneven distribution of marital assets could not meet
Kathi’s needs, long-term alimony was appropriate.1048
In Virgin v. Virgin,1049 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in making interim orders for
alimony and child custody in favor of Ms. Virgin before Mr.
Virgin’s appeal had been heard.1050  Mr. Virgin appealed the
superior court’s order because it failed to make factual findings
regarding the parties’ relative economic positions, Mr. Virgin’s
1037. See id. at 522.
1038. See id.
1039. Id. at 523.
1040. See id. at 524.
1041. 991 P.2d 195 (Alaska 1999).
1042. See id. at 199.
1043. See id. at 197.
1044. See id.
1045. See id.
1046. See id.
1047. See id. at 199.
1048. See id.
1049. 990 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 1999).
1050. See id. at 1043.
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ability to pay, and child custody.1051  The supreme court held that a
trial court need not make such findings, so long as the reasons for
its holding are obvious from the record.1052  In this case, the record
was replete with information and findings concerning the parties’
economic positions and the child custody issue.1053
D. Miscellaneous
In R.J.M. v. State,1054 the supreme court held that two parents
were objectively unwilling to provide care for their children.1055
P.M., the mother, suffered from mental problems that precluded
her from caring for her children.1056  R.J.M., the father, did not
spend much time with his son and in 1992 stipulated that his son
should be in state custody for a period of not more than two
years.1057  Moreover, when his son was to be returned to him, R.J.M.
refused to take custody saying that “it would not be in the child[‘s]
best interest to return home that day.”1058  The supreme court
upheld the court’s termination of each parent’s rights based on its
finding that no available person was willing to provide care for the
child.1059  The supreme court rejected R.J.M.’s arguments that
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) “fails to give adequate
notice of prohibited conduct” and “encourages arbitrary
enforcement.”1060  Though the supreme court acknowledged the
potential problems in allowing courts to terminate parental rights
for emotional neglect, it observed that this case involved “more
than simple coldness.”1061
In B.E.B. v. R.L.B.,1062 the supreme court overturned its prior
case law and held that the paternity by estoppel doctrine may be
invoked against a putative father only upon a showing of economic,
rather than emotional, prejudice.1063  The trial court, relying on
current case law, estopped B.E.B. from disputing paternity because
1051. See id.
1052. See id.
1053. See id. at 1044.
1054. 973 P.2d 79 (Alaska 1999).
1055. See id. at 85-86.
1056. See id. at 80-81.
1057. See id. at 82.
1058. Id.
1059. See id. at 85-86.
1060. Id. at 87.
1061. Id. at 86.
1062. 979 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1999).
1063. See id. at 519.
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of possible emotional harm to the child K.1064  The supreme court
rejected as erroneous the emotional test’s assumption that forcing
the non-biological parent to pay child support will encourage a
lasting emotional bond.1065
In T.P.D. v. A.P.D.,1066 the supreme court held that a father’s
disestablishment claim was not barred by laches.1067  T.P.D. was not
A.P.D.’s biological father but was listed as her father on her birth
certificate.1068  T.P.D. married A.P.D.’s mother while she was still
pregnant with A.P.D. and separated from the mother when A.P.D.
was four years old.1069  CSED issued a support order to T.P.D., who
then filed a complaint in superior court seeking disestablishment of
paternity and termination of his duty to support.1070  The supreme
court stated that it was not unreasonable for T.P.D. to wait until
after the separation before initiating disestablishment, because he
would have expected to support A.P.D. until the actual decision to
separate.1071  The court further held that laches should not be a
defense against disestablishment in cases where there has not been
a prior judicial determination of paternity.1072
In Elliot v. James,1073 the supreme court held that a husband’s
misrepresentations about his marital and criminal history did not
entitle the wife to an annulment.1074  Elliot sought an annulment of
her marriage to James on the grounds that his misrepresentations
that he was never married and that he had not been convicted of a
misdemeanor were fraudulent.1075  Elliot did not argue that she was
induced by the absence of a prior marriage, but that she married
James believing him to be an honest person.1076  The supreme court
rejected Elliot’s fraud claim, noting that almost every marriage
could be annulled if misrepresentations of character justified
annulment.1077
1064. See id. at 515-16.
1065. See id.
1066. 981 P.2d 116 (Alaska 1999).
1067. See id. at 121.
1068. See id. at 118.
1069. See id.
1070. See id.
1071. See id. at 121.
1072. See id.
1073. 977 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999).
1074. See id. at 731-33.
1075. See id. at 729.
1076. See id. at 731.
1077. See id. at 731-32.
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IX.  INSURANCE LAW
In Ruggles v. Grow,1078 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
once an insurer pays an insured party’s claim for medical expenses,
the insured party loses the right to unilaterally present a claim for
medical expenses against the tortfeasor who caused the injuries.1079
Ruggles was injured by Grow in a car accident.1080  Ruggles’ insurer
covered her medical expenses from the medical payments coverage
of her policy, and ordered her not to pursue any medical claims
against Grow.1081  Ruggles ignored her insurer and sought medical
expenses from Grow.1082  The supreme court held that once
Ruggles’s medical expenses were paid by her insurer, Ruggles’
claim for medical expenses became subrogated and assigned to her
insurer.1083  Ruggles could not pursue any action for medical
expenses without first obtaining the insurer’s permission.1084
In Fejes v. Alaska Insurance Co.,1085 the supreme court held
that a contractor sued by a homeowner for misrepresentation and
breach of warranty related to defects caused by a subcontractor’s
faulty construction could seek indemnification under his
comprehensive general liability insurance policy.1086  Plaintiff
homeowner sued Fejes when her home’s septic system failed; it was
determined at trial that the failure was due to a subcontractor’s
faulty work.1087  Fejes’ insurance company refused to indemnify
him.1088  The supreme court held that the homeowner’s claims were
for property damage rooted in the faulty construction, and were
thus covered under Fejes’ insurance policy, notwithstanding that
the judgment against Fejes was for misrepresentation and breach of
warranty.1089  The court reasoned that the misrepresentation and
breach of warranty claims grew out of the construction defect, and
were thus covered under the policy.1090  The supreme court also
held that coverage was not excluded by a clause in the policy that
eliminated coverage for “property damage to the named insured’s
1078. 984 P.2d 509 (Alaska 1999).
1079. See id. at 512.
1080. See id. at 511.
1081. See id.
1082. See id.
1083. See id. at 512.
1084. See id.
1085. 984 P.2d 519 (Alaska 1999).
1086. See id. at 521.
1087. See id.
1088. See id.
1089. See id. at 523.
1090. See id.
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products arising out of such products.”1091  The court reasoned that
a “product” under the policy did not encompass a completed
building.1092
In Williams v. Wainscott,1093 the Great Atlantic Insurance
Company (“GAIC”) contracted with Pacific Marine Insurance
Company of Alaska (“PacAk”) to reinsure its policies.1094  PacAk
was, at times, a subsidiary of Pacific Marine Insurance Company of
Washington (“PacWa”), which became liable for all of PacAk’s
liabilities until 1985.1095  In 1989, all three companies became
insolvent; however, GAIC still retained four outstanding claims
against PacAk.1096  GAIC submitted its claims after a judicially
imposed March 1, 1990, deadline.1097  PacAk’s receiver denied the
submissions.1098  GAIC objected to the denial and requested a
hearing, where the superior court held the receiver’s decision to
deny the claim was supported by substantial evidence.1099
The supreme court reversed the superior court’s application of
the substantial evidence standard and held that insurance
liquidation statutes require the receiver’s denial of insurer’s claims
to be reviewed under a de novo standard.1100  The court also held
that the insured was entitled to notice of the liquidation order and
deadline for filing claims against the reinsurer’s estate.1101  The
court remanded for a determination of whether the notice
requirements were met, since notice was not sent to GAIC’s last
known address.1102  The court further held that the superior court
should resolve the remaining issues in the case, such as whether the
late filing with PacAk could be excused because of a timely filing
with PacWa, and which of the two reinsurance companies should
be liable as the reinsurer.1103
In Alaska National Insurance Co. v. Jones,1104 the supreme
court held that the trial court improperly dismissed the insurer’s
claims against the insured’s attorneys, and that the insurer’s claims
1091. Id. at 526.
1092. Id.
1093. 974 P.2d 975(Alaska 1999).
1094. See id. at 976.
1095. See id.
1096. See id. at 976-77.
1097. See id. at 977.
1098. See id.
1099. See id.
1100. See id. at 978.
1101. See id. at 980.
1102. See id.
1103. See id. at 981-83.
1104. 993 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1999).
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stated a cause of action for which relief could be granted.1105  The
insured was injured on the job, and received worker’s
compensation benefits from the insurer.1106  Later, the insured sued
the third-party manufacturer of the machine that allegedly caused
the insured’s injury.1107  The insurer filed suit against the insured
and his two attorneys, Robert Rehbock and Paul Paslay, claiming
that it was entitled to reimbursement from the settlement.1108  The
trial court dismissed the claims against Rehbock and Paslay, and
the insurer appealed.1109  The supreme court reversed and
remanded the case.1110  The court held that under Alaska Statutes
section 23.30.015(g), the insurer is allowed to proceed against the
settlement fund, not just the insured.1111  Since the insurer claimed
that Rehbock and Paslay held some or all of the insured’s funds,
the insurer’s complaint stated a colorable cause of action “that
could be enforced as a constructive trust or equitable lien against
Rehbock and Paslay. . . .”1112
In State Farm Insurance Co. v. Raymer,1113 the supreme court
held that Raymer had an “insurable interest” in her husband’s
truck, despite her name not being on the title, because she would
have been disadvantaged from its loss.1114  Someone intentionally
set fire to a truck that belonged to Raymer’s husband.1115  In a claim
against the insurance company, the trial court granted summary
judgment to Raymer and awarded her one-half the insurance
proceeds on the grounds that she was an innocent co-insured.1116
The supreme court stated that, “[a]s a general principle, a wife who
has a pecuniary or beneficial interest in her husband’s property, or
would have some disadvantage from its loss, has an insurable
interest therein.”1117  Because it was not clear whether the truck was
marital property, the supreme court remanded for a factual
determination of the extent of Raymer’s interest in the truck.1118
1105. See id. at 425.
1106. See id.
1107. See id.
1108. See id. at 426.
1109. See id.
1110. See id. at 428.
1111. See id. at 427-28.
1112. Id. at 428.
1113. 977 P.2d 706 (Alaska 1999).
1114. See id. at 710.
1115. See id. at 707.
1116. See id. at 708.
1117. Id. at 710.
1118. See id. at 711.
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X.  PROPERTY
In Beluga Mining Co. v. State,1119 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that Alaska did not commit a taking when it refused to
approve a mining lease application for Beluga Mining Company
when the State was subject to a temporary injunction due to
existing claims.1120  In 1989 and 1990, Alaska leased mining rights
for public land to Beluga.1121  Yet in July 1990, in another case,
Weiss v. State,1122 a court granted a temporary injunction on
Alaska’s ability to control mining rights to public lands.1123  As a
result, Beluga was unable to secure a permit necessary to begin
mining, although it continued to rent the land from the state until
November 1994, when it ran out of funds to pay rent.1124  The
temporary injunction was lifted in December 1994.1125
The supreme court concluded there was no taking because a
taking occurs only when the State deprives someone of a property
right.1126  In the instant case, although Beluga retained property
rights in the land and never had the right to mine, it was clear from
the beginning that the mining rights were contingent on State
licensing.1127  Additionally, the court found neither breach of
contract nor unjust enrichment.1128  Since there had been no intent
to enter into a contract, and because there was no consideration,
there was no contract between the State and Beluga.1129  There was
no unjust enrichment because Beluga received something for the
rental payments: preservation of rights in the mining claims.1130
In McDonald v. Harris,1131 the supreme court elaborated on the
requirements for prescriptive easement: continuity, hostility, and
notoriety for at least ten years.1132  From 1983, Harris maintained
and used a driveway leading to her land and encroaching on
McDonald’s property.1133  However, McDonald did not realize that
1119. 973 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1999).
1120. See id. at 577.
1121. See id.
1122. 706 P.2d 681 (Alaska 1985).
1123. See id. at 681-84
1124. See Beluga, 973 P.2d at 573.
1125. See id. at 574.
1126. See id. at 575.
1127. See id.
1128. See id. at 578.
1129. See id.
1130. See id. at 579.
1131. 978 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1999).
1132. See id. at 83.
1133. See id. at 82.
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the driveway occupied her property until a 1995 survey.1134  The
supreme court reasoned that Harris was entitled to a prescriptive
easement because her use was continuous; it did not matter that a
third party had also used the driveway.1135  Furthermore, continuity
was preserved as long as Harris was the primary user.1136  In
addition, the encroachment was hostile; McDonald was not
permitting use, since she had no knowledge that the driveway was
on her property.1137  McDonald’s lack of knowledge that the
driveway encroached on her property did not refute the notoriety
requirement; for notoriety, use need only be open and known.1138
In Interior Regional Housing Authority v. James,1139 the
supreme court held that the Alaska Landlord Tenant Act did not
impose a duty of maintenance upon the State when it entered
Mutual Help and Occupancy Agreements (“MHO
Agreements”).1140  Denise James entered into an MHO Agreement
with the Interior Regional Housing Authority (“IRHA”) and
moved into a home in Fort Yukon in 1988.1141  Many of the
occupants in the Fort Yukon Homes had complained about
difficulties with the heating systems in the homes.1142  In response,
the IRHA and other parties collaborated to address the problems
with the heating systems.1143  In particular, the IRHA arranged for
repairs to James’ furnace.1144  In 1995, a fire occurred in James’
home resulting in the death of her son and injuries to her and her
daughter.1145
The supreme court noted that the MHO Agreement was
created in accordance with the Indian Housing Act (“IHA”), an act
of the United States Congress.1146  As mandated by the IHA, the
MHO Agreement contained a provision that placed the
responsibility of maintenance of the dwelling upon the occupying
family.1147  The supreme court determined that the IHA preempted
the state act that might impose the duty of maintenance upon the
1134. See id.
1135. See id. at 84.
1136. See id.
1137. See id. at 85.
1138. See id.
1139. 989 P.2d 145 (Alaska 1999).
1140. See id. at 147.
1141. See id. at 146.
1142. See id. at 147.
1143. See id.
1144. See id.
1145. See id.
1146. See id. at 150.
1147. See id.
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State.1148  The supreme court remanded for a determination
whether the IRHA had later assumed an obligation by its
endeavors to repair James’ heating system.1149
In Moore v. State Department of Natural Resources,1150 the
supreme court held that the State’s grant of mining rights,
contingent on the federal government’s approval of transfer,
constituted a mining right that was voidable under Alaska Statutes
section 38.05.190(a).1151  Pacific Ranier, Inc. (“PRI”) located and
recorded certificates for more than 200 mining claims and
prospecting sites on federal land that had been selected pursuant to
Section 6 of the Alaska Statehood Act.1152  However, the director of
the Division of Mining Rights nullified PRI’s mining rights because
PRI was not qualified to engage in business in Alaska.1153  Section
38.05.190(a) requires that foreign corporations be qualified to
engage in business in Alaska before they can acquire mining rights
in Alaska.1154  Moore, the President of PRI, appealed, arguing that
the Division could not nullify PRI’s priority because the mining
rights would not actually be transferred until the federal
government approved the transfer.1155  Thus, according to Moore,
PRI had only acquired a “claim in waiting” that would be
transferable as a mining right upon federal approval.1156  The
supreme court disagreed, stating that a mining priority could not be
separated from mining rights under Alaska Statutes section
38.05.190(a).1157  Therefore, the Division was correct in nullifying
PRI’s mining claims.1158
In AU International, Inc. v. State Department of Natural
Resources,1159 the supreme court held that a mine owner abandoned
its claims to 1035 mines when it failed to meet the statutory filing
requirements, regardless of the mine owner’s intent.1160  The mine
owner attempted to file statutorily required labor statements on
the last available filing date for only four of the 1039 mines to
1148. See id.
1149. See id. at 151.
1150. 992 P.2d 576 (Alaska 1999).
1151. See id. at 579.
1152. See id. at 576.
1153. See id.
1154. See id.
1155. See id.
1156. See id. at 578.
1157. See id.
1158. See id.
1159. 971 P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1999).
1160. See id. at 1038.
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which the owner had claim.1161  Seven months later, when the mine
owner attempted to record an amended affidavit and pay filing
fees, the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) notified the
mine owner that its previous failure to file constituted an
abandonment of the claims.1162  The DNR later denied the mine
owner’s request for a Certificate of Substantial Compliance and
denied reconsideration because its claims were “abandoned by
action of law and . . . no compelling evidence of substantial
compliance has been provided in support of a Certificate.”1163  The
supreme court upheld the DNR decisions because “a statement of
annual labor that does not accurately set out the ‘essential facts’ is
void, has no effect, and may not be amended,” and such failure to
file constitutes abandonment, regardless of the mine owner’s
intent.1164  In so holding, the court considered that the
circumstances preventing the mine owner from filing were not
beyond its control, the mine owner failed to learn the proper filing
fees, and the mine owner did not attempt to correct the mistakes
until seven months later.1165
In Donnelly v. Eklutna, Inc.,1166 the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff
corporation.1167  Eklutna had a land patent in the contested
property.1168  The company sued the wife and children of deceased
homesteader Joseph Donnelly in state court to have them ejected
from the land, to quiet title, and to be awarded declaratory relief.1169
The supreme court held that Donnelly’s occupancy claim had been
resolved in a prior federal case,1170 and that, therefore, “the section
14(c)(1) claims of all members of the Donnelly family” were barred
by res judicata.1171  According to the court, Joseph Donnelly’s wife
and children were in privity with him as the family jointly occupied
the land in dispute as homesteaders.1172  In other words, each
individual’s claim derived from the family’s common occupation
1161. See id. at 1036.
1162. See id.
1163. Id. at 1037-38.
1164. Id.
1165. See id. at 1040.
1166. 973 P.2d 87 (Alaska 1999).
1167. See id. at 90.
1168. See id.
1169. See id.
1170. See id. at 89 (citing Donnelly v. U.S., 850 F.2d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1988)).
1171. Id. at 92.
1172. See id. at 93.
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and thereby created a “unity of interests” between Joseph
Donnelly and his family.1173
In State v. Hale,1174 the supreme court held that Alaska Statutes
section 43.23.015(a) did not bar a person from permanent fund
dividend eligibility when that person leaves Alaska to accompany
an eligible spouse on military service.1175  Hale, an Alaska resident,
was denied a dividend check when she left Alaska to accompany
her eligible spouse to a new military station.1176  The supreme court
held that Hale’s absence was allowable, and not a “principal”
factor in determining her residency, because of the Alaska
residency of her spouse.1177  Alternatively, the supreme court held
that Hale could prevail by showing an intent to return and live
permanently in Alaska.1178
In Ellingstad v. State Department of Natural Resources,1179 the
supreme court held that the conveyance of a quitclaim deed
satisfied contract terms, even though the state leasing agency had
transferred its lessor rights.1180  Ellingstad had purchased several
properties under the state land lottery sales program subject to an
installment contract.1181  Subsequent to the transfers to Ellingstad,
the State transferred its interest in the land.1182  When Ellingstad
was late with payments to the State’s assignee, the assignee
conveyed a quitclaim deed to Ellingstad.1183  The supreme court
held that the conveyance of the quitclaim deed satisfied the terms
of the purchaser’s contract with the State,1184 and that the State was
free to transfer its interest in the land.1185  In addition, the court held
that it would be poor public policy to compel creditors to file
counterclaims for repayment when sued by debtors, because such
counterclaims would preclude any amicable settlement.1186
In Osborne v. Buckman,1187 the supreme court held that the
statute of limitations had not run on a foreclosure claim, despite
1173. Id.
1174. 978 P.2d 1276 (Alaska 1999).
1175. See id. at 1277.
1176. See id. at 1276.
1177. Id. at 1278.
1178. See id. at 1277.
1179. 979 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1999).
1180. See id. at 1012.
1181. See id. at 1003.
1182. See id.
1183. See id.
1184. See id. at 1004-05.
1185. See id. at 1006.
1186. See id. at 1011-12.
1187. 993 P.2d 409 (Alaska 1999).
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the limit having run on a claim for the underlying debt.1188  After a
property changed hands several times, Kenai Merit Inn
Corporation (“Kenai”) was obligated to Kevin Buckman for a note
secured by a second deed of trust.  Buckman was, in turn, obligated
to the Osbornes for a note secured by the first deed of trust.  In
1988, Kenai stopped making payments on the second deed and in
1989, Buckman stopped making payments on the first deed and
Kenai filed for bankruptcy, which resulted in an automatic stay.1189
In 1990, the bankruptcy court granted Buckman’s motion
requesting relief from the stay.1190  No actions were filed regarding
the property until 1996 when Buckman initiated an action to
foreclose on the second deed of trust.1191  The Osbornes then sought
to claim title by enforcing the first deed of trust.1192  The supreme
court rejected Buckman’s assertion that the six-year statute of
limitations barred the Osbornes’ suit, noting that the Osbornes had
the option of commencing suits to foreclose on the property or to
recover the underlying debt at separate times.1193  Because an
automatic stay prevented suit on foreclosure of the property, the
statute of limitations on the foreclosure claim did not begin
running until the stay was lifted.1194  Therefore, the Osbornes, who
initiated their suit in September 1996, were within the six-year
statute of limitations.1195
XI.  TORT LAW
In Dinsmore-Puff v. Alvord,1196 the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed a verdict in favor of the defendant on a negligence action
based on the murder of the plaintiff’s child by the defendant’s
child.1197  The court concluded that general knowledge of the child’s
past misconduct, without more, was not sufficient to affix liability,
as it places too much of a burden on parents to be prison wardens
of their children until they turn eighteen.1198  Because the parents
had taken reasonable steps to attempt to control their child’s
known propensity for violent behavior, and because the parents
1188. Id. at 413.
1189. See id.
1190. See id.
1191. See id.
1192. See id.
1193. See id. at 412.
1194. See id.
1195. See id.
1196. 972 P.2d 978 (Alaska 1999).
1197. See id. at 987.
1198. See id.
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could not have foreseen the need and opportunity to prevent their
child from harming another child, they could not be held liable for
their child’s conduct.1199
In Taylor v. Johnston,1200 Taylor was left a paraplegic after
defendant treated him for migraine headaches.1201  After a jury
rejected Taylor’s negligence claim, he appealed on the ground that
the trial court erred by denying his motion to amend the complaint
to include a battery claim.1202  The battery claim was based on
Taylor’s contention that defendant was not properly licensed, and
therefore had fraudulently induced Taylor to submit to his medical
care.1203  The supreme court noted that medical fraud could be
analyzed and denied in two ways: (1) if the claim is so frivolous that
it is legally insufficient on its face, or (2) the degree of prejudice to
the opposing party outweighs the hardship to movant if the
amendment is denied.1204  Relying on the first approach, the
supreme court indicated that a cause of action for medical fraud
was valid where an imposter cajoled a victim into enlisting his
services by using false credentials.1205  This would be true even if the
imposter intended to help the victim, because motive is not an
element of the claim.1206  In Taylor’s case, the claim was insufficient
because the defendant was fully accredited.1207  The supreme court
also rejected Taylor’s second ground for appeal, that the trial court
erred by not granting his motion to reopen discovery so that he
could find evidence supporting his battery claim.1208  Any error in
this respect was harmless because the trial court afforded Taylor
numerous opportunities to question the validity of defendant’s
medical credentials at trial.1209  Lastly, the supreme court decided
that although the trial court should have waited for a report from
the medical panel that Alaska requires in malpractice cases,1210
1199. See id. at 985.
1200. 985 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1999).
1201. See id. at 461.
1202. See id. at 463.
1203. See id. at 464.
1204. See id. (citing Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348
(Alaska 1987)).
1205. See id. at 465.
1206. See id. at 464.
1207. See id. at 465.
1208. See id. at 466.
1209. See id.
1210. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (LEXIS 1998).  Although this statute does not
require the court to use the medical negligence panel, the supreme court seemed
to feel that the trial court was obliged to allow it.  See Taylor, 985 P.2d at 466.
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Taylor did not object to this failure.1211  Thus, the issue was not
preserved for appeal.1212
In Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corporation,1213 the
supreme court held that the superior court erred when it granted
Exxon’s motion for summary judgment on the cities’ diverted-
services claim.1214  On March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez
ran aground spilling millions of gallons of crude oil.1215  In response
to the disaster, several cities including Kodiak Island Borough were
forced to participate in the massive cleanup operation.1216  This
action was commenced by Kodiak Island Borough to recover
damages from Exxon for the services diverted to the cleanup.1217
The trial court granted summary judgment to Exxon when it
decided that the statute covering hazardous spill liability did not
extend to diverted services costs.1218
Alaska Statutes section 46.03.822(a) imposes strict liability for
the harm caused by the release of hazardous substances.1219  Exxon
contended that the common law free public services doctrine
precluded recovery,1220 but the supreme court found that the
legislature intended broad coverage by the statute and that
hazardous substances cleanup operations, including those for oil
spills, are recoverable.1221  Exxon also claimed that the statutes did
not confer standing on the cities to claim diverted-services because
the services actually belonged to the citizens,1222 but the supreme
court held that the cities had standing, since they were suing to
replenish municipal funds that could be expended to benefit
citizens.1223  Finally, Exxon claimed that federal maritime law
preempts the cities from recovering for diverted-services.1224  The
supreme court held that states are not barred from applying their
own laws, unless the state remedy would work material prejudice
to federal maritime law or interfere with the uniformity of the law
1211. See id. at 467.
1212. See id.
1213. 991 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1999).
1214. See id. at 769.
1215. See id. at 759.
1216. See id.
1217. See id.
1218. See id.
1219. See id.
1220. See id. at 760.
1221. See id. at 764-65.
1222. See id. at 765-66.
1223. See id. at 766.
1224. See id.
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in its international or interstate application.1225  The Alaska statutes
did neither.1226  The supreme court thus held that the superior
court’s granting of Exxon’s summary judgment motion was error,
reversed it, and remanded the case for further proceedings.1227
In Chenga Corp. v. Exxon Corp.,1228 the supreme court held
that the superior court erred in precluding jury consideration of
claims under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“the Act”) for selected
but not yet conveyed federal lands.1229  Oil from the Exxon Valdez
spill was pushed by currents and winds to the shores of lands
owned by several Alaska Native corporations and federal land that
was selected but not yet conveyed to the corporations.1230  The
corporations sued Exxon on various liability theories for damage to
their real property and archeological sites and artifacts.1231  The
superior court found Exxon liable for damages on several claims,1232
but precluded the jury from considering damages for injury to the
not yet conveyed federal land.1233  The supreme court held that the
superior court erred by improperly requiring the corporations to
establish loss of a federally permitted use.1234  The supreme court
held that section 8301 of the Act1235 does more than simply confer
standing to the corporations; it states that interests in federal land
are considered vested in the corporations for purposes of the
Act.1236
In Falconer v. Adams,1237 defendant Taylor-Welch rear-ended
plaintiff Falconer when Falconer stopped abruptly in the midst of a
left turn to avoid colliding with defendant Adams, who was
allegedly in the wrong traffic lane.1238  The court rejected Taylor-
Welch’s claim that she was entitled to an offset of damages
awarded to Falconer, because Adams’ insurance company,
Allstate, made a payment to Falconer’s insurance company, State
Farm.1239  The court concluded that Taylor-Welch failed to prove
1225. See id. at 766-69.
1226. See id.
1227. See id. at 769.
1228. 991 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1999).
1229. See id. at 799.
1230. See id. at 774.
1231. See id.
1232. See id.
1233. See id. at 783.
1234. See id. at 786.
1235. 43 U.S.C. § 1642 (1994).
1236. See Chenga, 991 P.2d at 783.
1237. 974 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1999).
1238. See id. at 408.
1239. See id. at 410-11.
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that Allstate’s payment extinguished State Farm’s right of
subrogation against Falconer and was not merely a gratuitous
benefit to Falconer.1240 As the court explained, “no evidence was
presented below that would have enabled the court to determine
the basis for or the specific terms of any interagency agreement, or
the legal effect of the Allstate payment to State Farm.”1241
In Ardinger v. Hummell,1242 the supreme court held that the
trial court’s instructions to the jury on the elements of negligent
entrustment constituted reversible error.1243  Sherie Ardinger, the
mother of Joshua Van Barel, sued Normandy Hummel and her
mother for negligence after Hummel and Van Barel were involved
in a car accident in Hummel’s mother’s car.1244  Von Barel was
driving and died in the accident.1245  Ardinger argued that the jury
was improperly instructed that fifteen-year-old Hummel was not to
be held to an adult standard of care, that the instruction on the
elements of negligent entrustment was erroneous, and that the jury
should have been given a negligence per se instruction.1246
The supreme court agreed with Ardinger that the trial court’s
instructions were erroneous.1247  The court stated that driving is an
adult activity; because Hummel took control of the car, she should
be held to an adult standard of care.1248  Furthermore, the trial court
improperly included an extra element which may have affected the
jury’s verdict and therefore constituted reversible error.1249  Last,
with respect to negligence per se, the supreme court held that
Hummel may have violated a statute, therefore potentially making
her negligent per se.  The trial court’s failure to include this
instruction constituted reversible error.1250
In Chaffin v. United States,1251 the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s granting of summary judgment on behalf of the
federal government on a Federal Tort Claims Act suit.1252  Chaffin
was badly mauled and permanently disfigured by a polar bear that
broke through his window at a remote radar system site owned by
1240. See id. at 412.
1241. Id.
1242. 982 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1999).
1243. See id. at 729.
1244. See id. at 730.
1245. See id.
1246. See id. at 730-34.
1247. See id. at 738.
1248. See id. at 731.
1249. See id. at 733.
1250. See id. at 734.
1251. 176 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
1252. See id. at 1214.
YIR.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:17 AM
2000] YEAR IN REVIEW 259
the U.S. Air Force.1253  Chaffin argued that the government was
negligent by allowing a dangerous condition to exist on its
property.1254  Specifically, Chaffin argued that the government
created site housing that was not safe from intrusion by polar bears
and that the government allowed whalemeat, known to entice
polar bears, to be stored on premises near the housing.1255  He also
argued that the government was negligent in forbidding the
employees at the remote site from maintaining firearms, which
could have been used to mitigate the damages.1256  The Ninth
Circuit concluded that although Chaffin was an employee of a
contractor and not of the government at the time of the injury, the
record left “unresolved questions about the relationship between
the government as landowner and the [independent] contractor as
Chaffin’s employer.”1257
In Sherbahn v. Kerkove,1258 the supreme court explored
damage awards in a personal injury automobile collision case.1259
The plaintiff suffered back problems and sought recovery for
trigger-point spinal injections.1260  On appeal, the defendants argued
that the cost of treatment should be discounted to present value in
accordance with Alaska law.1261  The court held that although
reduction to present value was required on the statute’s face, such
a result would be absurd in this case, in which the full amount
would be immediately used for medical treatment.1262  Further, the
court held that testimony regarding cost need not necessarily be
provided by a doctor from the institution to provide the proposed
treatment, because the jury only required some information from
which it could reasonably estimate the amount, and a
chiropractor’s testimony satisfied that requirement.1263  The court
also agreed with plaintiff that prejudgment interest on past
economic loss is computed from the time when defendant has
1253. See id. at 1210.
1254. See id. at 1211.
1255. See id.
1256. See id.
1257. Id. at 1214.
1258. 987 P.2d 195 (Alaska 1999).
1259. See id. at 195.
1260. See id. at 201.
1261. See id. at 200; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.040(b) (LEXIS 1998) (stating
that in computing lump sum award, fact finder should reduce current award to an
amount that will cover total damages if prudently invested over expected life of
injured party).
1262. See Sherbahn, 987 P.2d at 200.
1263. See id.
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notice of the claim.1264  Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument and ruled that the enhanced interest rule applies only to
interest accruing before final judgment, not to post-judgment
delays of payment.1265
In Wilson v. United States,1266 the Ninth Circuit certified a
question to the Alaska Supreme Court as to whether a plaintiff
who suffered no physical injury may recover damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress when, through the negligence of
another, the plaintiff unwittingly became the instrument that
caused injury to an innocent victim.1267  Kallstrom inadvertently fed
poison negligently stored by the defendant to the plaintiff, causing
severe injuries to plaintiff and severe emotional distress to
Kallstrom.1268  The district court dismissed Kallstrom’s negligence
claim because she failed to show physical injury and could not meet
the exceptions to the bystander injury rule.1269  The Ninth Circuit
held that the present case did not fit neatly within the negligent
infliction of emotional distress doctrine because Kallstrom was an
active participant in causing injury to the plaintiff and not just a
bystander.1270
In Crosby v. United States,1271 the district court held that in the
absence of controlling precedent, the Alaska Supreme Court would
most likely not recognize a cause of action for “loss of chance” in
medical malpractice actions.1272  Plaintiff sued defendant when her
husband died while in defendant’s employ.1273  The district court
held that recognizing a “loss of chance” action against the
plaintiff’s husband’s doctor would relax the strict causation
standard enacted by the Alaska Legislature and that the
Legislature’s policy choice should be respected by the courts.1274
1264. See id. at 202 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.070(b) (LEXIS 1998)).
1265. See id. at 203 (reasoning that applying the additional interest to the time
period between final judgment and actual payment would not served the
enhanced interest rule’s policy of avoiding protracted litigation); see also ALASKA
STAT. § 09.30.065 (LEXIS 1998) (assessing as a means of encouraging settlement
before trial a penalty of 5% additional interest if the final judgment was not more
favorable to the offeree than a pre-trial settlement offer).
1266. 190 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 1999).
1267. See id. at 963.
1268. See id. at 961.
1269. See id.
1270. See id. at 962.
1271. 48 F. Supp. 2d 924 (D. Alaska 1999).
1272. See id. at 931.
1273. See id. at 925.
1274. See id. at 931-32.
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In Universal Motors, Inc. v. Neary,1275 the supreme court held
that Alaska’s former comparative fault statute did not require a
one-action rule for all tortfeasors responsible for a plaintiff’s
injury.1276  Plaintiff’s tort action against one defendant was
dismissed by summary judgment; plaintiff then filed a tort action
against another defendant for the same injuries.1277  The second
defendant filed for summary judgment, contending that Alaska’s
comparative fault statute required plaintiffs to join all potential
defendants into one action, and that plaintiff’s failure to do so was
fatal to his case.1278  The supreme court reasoned that such a rule
would lead to needless joinder of parties whose fault is remote;
whether Alaska should adopt such a rule is a policy question best
left to the legislature, not to the courts.1279
In Cable v. Shefchik,1280 the supreme court held that the
superior court’s refusal to give negligence per se instructions was
an abuse of discretion because General Safety Code section
01.0802(a) established a detailed standard of care applicable to
machine guarding.1281  Cable injured his hand in a flapper valve
while clearing out a concrete pump that was missing a valve
guard.1282  Cable was not an employee of Shefchik at the time, but
was “learning the ropes” with hopes of becoming an employee in
the future.1283  The jury found Shefchik negligent but concluded that
his negligence did not legally cause Cable’s injury.1284  The supreme
court noted that it was undisputed that the guard would have
prevented the injury and concluded that the superior court abused
its “extremely limited” discretion by refusing to issue a per se
instruction.1285  Because the jury did not state the nature of
Shefchik’s negligence, and because it was not given a per se
instruction, it was unclear how the jury reached its conclusion on
causation.1286  Accordingly, the supreme court remanded the case
for a new trial.1287
1275. 984 P.2d 515 (Alaska 1999).
1276. See id. at 516.
1277. See id.
1278. See id.
1279. See id. at 517.
1280. 985 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1999).
1281. See id. at 475.
1282. See id.
1283. Id. at 474.
1284. See id. at 478.
1285. See id. at 479.
1286. See id.
1287. See id. at 480-81.
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In Law Offices of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Borg-Warner
Security Corp.,1288 the supreme court held that (1) the statute of
limitations for Smith’s claims of fraud and intentional interference
with contract was not tolled during the time Smith believed he was
collaterally estopped from bringing his claim due to the remoteness
of the defendant’s possible success in asserting collateral
estoppel;1289 (2) the two-year statute of limitations applying to
economic losses rather than the six-year statute of limitations
applicable to contract matters applied;1290 and (3) the defendant was
not equitably estopped from asserting that the claim was barred by
the statute of limitations.1291  This appeal arose from a complex set
of facts relating to a wrongful death suit that resulted from an
airplane crash.1292  Attorney Smith missed a filing date for the
wrongful death suit and was later sued for malpractice.1293  The suit
was reinstated when it was found, through discovery in another
suit, that a defective carburetor and not pilot error had caused the
plane crash.1294
Attorney Smith then tried to sue the carburetor manufacturer
for intentionally concealing the defect and thereby causing his
delayed filing (because he could not identify a cause of action)
which led to his being sued for malpractice and his contingency fee
contract being terminated.1295  The court “conclude[d] that a party
arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled because of
collateral estoppel must show that the estoppel bar made suit futile
by clear and convincing evidence.”1296  Further, the court held that
because Smith’s economic losses did not arise from a contract
between Smith and the defendant, the two-year statute of
limitations governs the economic losses claim.1297  Finally, the court
held that because Smith could have filed suit on his own behalf and
conducted discovery, he was not relying on the defendant’s
misrepresentation and, therefore, the defendant could assert the
statute of limitations.1298
1288. 993 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1999).
1289. See id. at 444.
1290. See id. at 446.
1291. See id. at 447.
1292. See id. at 438.
1293. See id. at 439.
1294. See id. at 441.
1295. See id. at 442.
1296. Id. at 444.
1297. See id. at 446.
1298. See id. at 447.
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In Bennett v. Weimar,1299 the supreme court upheld summary
judgment against Bennett because she failed to properly notarize
her opposition to the condominium association board members’
and officers’ motion for summary judgment.1300  Bennett brought
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage against condominium association
board members Weimar and Cronea in their individual
capacities.1301  Bennett had opposed Weimar’s motion for summary
judgment, but had relied on a declaration that was not notarized.1302
The declaration did not state that Bennett was unable to locate a
notary.1303  The supreme court stated that such unverified pleadings
are statutorily inadmissible.1304  As a result, the court found no
genuine issues of material fact regarding Bennett’s claim.1305
In Fancyboy v. Alaska Village Electric Cooperative,1306 the
supreme court held that the superior court could reduce the
plaintiffs’ recovery by an amount allocated to a co-plaintiff that
was not impleaded as a third-party defendant.1307  The Fancyboys
bought a small home that needed electricity in the Alaska bush.1308
The Alaska Village Electric Cooperative (“AVEC”) could not
properly connect electricity for several months, so Mr. Fancyboy
ran a cable routing some power from a neighbor’s home to his.1309
The house burned with most of the family inside, killing a child and
injuring family members.1310  The family sued AVEC for personal
injuries, wrongful death, and property damage resulting from the
fire.1311  The jury found that Mr. Fancyboy and AVEC shared
negligence.1312  Mr. Fancyboy had used too weak a wire to connect
the electricity, and was passed out from drinking beer at the time of
the accident.1313  For its part, AVEC negligently failed to discover
or warn of the condition.1314  On appeal, the supreme court upheld
1299. 975 P.2d 691 (Alaska 1999).
1300. See id. at 698.
1301. See id. at 693.
1302. See id.
1303. See id.
1304. See id. at 694; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.63.010 (LEXIS 1998).
1305. See Bennett, 975 P.2d at 699.
1306. 984 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1999).
1307. See id. at 1134.
1308. See id. at 1130.
1309. See id.
1310. See id. at 1131.
1311. See id.
1312. See id.
1313. See id.
1314. See id.
YIR.FINAL.FMT.DOC 05/01/00  11:17 AM
264 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [17:1
the trial court because Alaska law1315 permits allocation of fault to a
co-plaintiff without impleading the co-plaintiff as a third party, and
because AVEC provided adequate notice of intent to allocate fault
to Mr. Fancyboy.1316
In Pugliese v. Perdue,1317 the supreme court ordered a new trial
where the evidence did not support the jury’s denial of
compensation.1318  At trial, Pugliese presented medical testimony
showing that he suffered a back injury after being hit by Perdue’s
truck.1319  Perdue admitted his negligence but claimed that Pugliese
was “embellishing” his compensation claims.1320  The jury awarded
Pugliese no damages, in spite of the fact that the two parties had
stipulated to $1,057 in medical bills.1321  The supreme court ordered
a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence.1322  While a question remained as to the scope and
seriousness of Pugliese’s injury, Perdue offered no evidence
refuting the existence of at least some back injury.1323  Nor did the
evidence show that Pugliese’s injuries were sustained elsewhere.1324
In addition, Perdue repeatedly acknowledged the existence of
some liability.1325
In Sauve v. Winfree,1326 the supreme court held that defendants
who both owned a commercial premises and supervised the
corporation that leased the premises could be liable as commercial
landlords if neglect of their duties caused the injury.1327  Winfree
and Nix owned a commercial premise as partners.1328  They leased
the premises to 10th & M Seafoods, a corporation they owned
entirely.1329  In 1992, Sauve, an employee of 10th & M Seafoods,
injured herself on a stairwell that violated Uniform Building Code
regulations.1330  However, the court also noted that the “inextricably
intertwined” rule of liability relating to commercial landlords
1315. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (LEXIS 1998).
1316. See Fancyboy, 984 P.2d at 1134.
1317. 988 P.2d 577 (Alaska 1999).
1318. See id. at 583.
1319. See id. at 579.
1320. See id. at 580.
1321. See id.
1322. See id. at 579.
1323. See id.
1324. See id.
1325. See id.
1326. 985 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1999).
1327. See id. at 1003.
1328. See id. at 998.
1329. See id.
1330. See id. at 998-99.
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prevented Winfree and Nix from being liable as both landlords and
supervisors.1331  The court then reversed the lower court’s summary
judgment because a genuine factual issue remained as to whether
the duty to repair the stairwell belonged to Winfred and Nix as
landlords or as supervisors.1332
In Wal-Mart, Inc. v. Stewart,1333 the supreme court affirmed a
lower court decision granting punitive damages to the plaintiff,
Stewart, on tort claims for invasion of privacy and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.1334  Stewart, an African-American
employee of a McDonalds located within Wal-Mart,1335 sued Wal-
Mart for regularly searching his personal belongings as he exited
the Wal-Mart restroom.1336  Wal-Mart asked for a directed verdict, a
JNOV, and also asserted several evidentiary and procedural
errors.1337  The supreme court concluded that a jury could
reasonably have viewed the actions of Wal-Mart to have been done
on an unlawful basis, such as race, thus rendering a directed verdict
or JNOV unwarranted.1338  The court further held that a jury could
reasonably have found that the actions of Hardy, a Wal-Mart
assistant manager, were “sufficiently outrageous” to have caused
Stewart “significantly severe” emotional distress and allowed
Stewart to prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.1339
In Martinson v. ARCO Alaska, Inc.,1340 the supreme court held
that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of ARCO because there were genuine issues of material fact
in dispute as to the control ARCO had over the work site at which
Martinson was injured.1341  Martinson was employed by a company
under contract with ARCO to haul water from Vern Lake.1342
Martinson slipped and fell on some icy buildup near the pump
house where he filled his truck.1343  Martinson alleged that ARCO
retained control of the site and thus owed a duty to him.1344  ARCO
1331. Id. at 1002.
1332. See id. at 1003.
1333. 990 P.2d 626 (Alaska 1999).
1334. See id. at 626.
1335. See id.
1336. See id.
1337. See id. at 629.
1338. See id. at 630.
1339. Id. at 633.
1340. 989 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1999).
1341. See id. at 738.
1342. See id. at 735.
1343. See id.
1344. See id.
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claimed that it did not retain control of the site and that the site
was supposed to be maintained exclusively by Martinson’s
employer.1345
The supreme court used the Moloso1346 independent contractor
test, which states that “an employer does retain control if the
employer (1) retains the right to direct the manner of the
independent contractor’s performance or (2) assumes affirmative
duties with respect to safety.”1347  The supreme court held that the
superior court correctly found that ARCO did not supervise the
independent contractor’s extraction of water.1348  However, the
supreme court reversed the trial court’s finding that there were no
genuine issues of material fact as to whether ARCO had
contractual or implied responsibilities related to snow and ice
removal.1349
In Ace v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,1350 the district court held
that $950,000 was the maximum allowable punitive damages award
in Ace’s wrongful denial of benefits claim.1351  Ace severely injured
her knee in a sledding accident.1352  Aetna denied Ace’s claim for
Long-Term Disability on several occasions, without ever
independently investigating the actual nature of her work or
whether she could actually perform her work.1353  After a trial, the
jury awarded Ace $27,009 for wrongful denial of disability,
$100,000 for emotional distress and $16.5 million in punitive
damages.1354
The Ninth Circuit determined the punitive damages to be
excessive and remanded the case with an order that Aetna’s
request for a new trial for damages be denied, on the condition that
Ace accept a remittitur to be determined by the district court.1355
The district court stated that there is no exact formula for
determining what constitutes excessive damages.1356  However, the
district court noted that the jury’s punitive damages award was one
hundred and thirty times the compensatory damages.1357  The
1345. See id.
1346. See Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 210-11 (Alaska 1982).
1347. Martinson, 989 P.2d at 736.
1348. See id.
1349. See id.
1350. 40 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Alaska 1999).
1351. See id. at 1136.
1352. See id. at 1129.
1353. See id.
1354. See id. at 1127.
1355. See id.
1356. See id.
1357. See id. at 1128.
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district court also noted that Aetna’s behavior could qualify for
punitive damages, but was not as reprehensible as behavior in prior
cases in which smaller punitive damage award ratios had been
awarded.1358  In determining that $950,000 would be the maximum
allowable punitive damages award, the district court noted, among
other factors, the importance of public confidence in insurance
companies, the extent of Aetna’s operations in Alaska, and the
deterrent effect of punitive damages.1359
In Denardo v. GCI Communication Corp.,1360 the supreme
court held that Denardo’s chance of winning GCI’s sweepstakes
was too remote and speculative to be the legal cause of Denardo’s
alleged injury.1361  Denardo sued GCI for breach of contract when
GCI terminated Denardo’s inactive calling card account; this
termination prevented Denardo from participating in GCI’s
sweepstakes.1362  Denardo sought the value of the prizes he claimed
he could have won if he had been able to enter the sweepstakes.1363
The supreme court held that Denardo’s damages claim was too
speculative because of their remoteness from the alleged breach.1364
In Bodzai v. Arctic Fjord, Inc.,1365 the supreme court held that
the superior court erred when it dismissed Bodzai’s claims based
on his employment contract forum selection clause, because
Bodzai’s claims did not arise under the terms of his employment
contract.1366  Bodzai, who was injured while employed aboard a
fishing vessel,1367 sued his employer for (1) maintenance, cure, and
unearned wages; (2) unseaworthiness; and (3) negligence.1368 The
employment contract had a forum selection clause, which the
superior court used to dismiss the case without prejudice, so that it
could be re-filed in the appropriate jurisdiction.1369  The supreme
court reversed the dismissal, finding that none of Bodzai’s causes of
action arose from his employment contract.1370
1358. See id. at 1128-30.
1359. See id. at 1130-35.
1360. 983 P.2d 1288 (Alaska 1999).
1361. See id. at 1289.
1362. See id.
1363. See id. at 1290.
1364. See id.
1365. 990 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1999).
1366. See id. at 621.
1367. See id. at 618.
1368. See id.
1369. See id.
1370. See id. at 621.
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In McGlothlin v. Municipality of Anchorage,1371 the supreme
court held that the arena and city owed McGlothlin no duty of
care, and that it was equitable to compel McGlothlin to pay twenty
percent of the defense’s legal fees.1372  McGlothlin injured his back
while loading a scoreboard belonging to his employer, Carrs, into
the city’s sports arena.1373  The city owed no duty of care because
the scoreboard belonged to Carrs, only Carrs employees were
moving the board, the city had no actual control or contractual
right to control the loading, and the injury resulted from
McGlothlin’s own actions.1374  The court also concluded that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to the
defendant because the award was not excessive and would not
deter parties who brought claims in good faith.1375
In Taranto v. North Slope Borough,1376 the North Slope
Borough (“NSB”) was sued for defamation when it publicly
accused a Barrow taxicab driver of selling alcohol and drugs.1377
The supreme court held that the appropriate standard for proving a
defamation claim against a city was “actual malice.”1378  The
common law confers a conditional privilege on government speech
concerning matters of public health and safety.1379  Under the actual
malice standard, the plaintiff was unsuccessful because speech on
matters of public concern is privileged unless the plaintiff can
prove that the speaker “uttered untruths with actual malice.”1380
Michael R. Asam
Antony L. Sanacory
William R. Terpening
Jonathan M. Werner*
1371. 991 P.2d 1273 (Alaska 1999).
1372. See id. at 1273.
1373. See id. at 1276.
1374. See id. at 1279.
1375. See id. at 1280.
1376. 992 P.2d 1111 (Alaska 1999).
1377. See id. at 1112.
1378. Id.
1379. See id. at 1114 n.12.
1380. Id. at 1115 (citing Fairbanks Publishing v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 784
(Alaska 1964)).
* The authors wish to thank Omar Swartz for his early assistance with this
project.
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APPENDIX
CASES OMITTED FROM 1999 YEAR IN REVIEW
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Tenala v. Fowler, 993 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding enhanced attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule
82(b)(3)).
Lane v. City of Kotzebue, 982 P.2d 1270 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the trial court improperly granted summary
judgment to the city and dismissed Lane’s negligence claim).
Flynn v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 988 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1999)
(denying Flynn’s post-settlement effort to modify a stipulated
protective order for failing to show particular good cause).
CRIMINAL LAW
Brueggeman v. Ashman, 973 P.2d 569 (Alaska 1999)
(dismissing Brueggeman’s writ of prohibition because he could
have raised the questions therein during his criminal trial and on
appeal).
INSURANCE LAW
Coulson v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 973 P.2d 1142 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the superior court properly granted summary
judgment, directed verdicts and jury verdicts against an
insurance broker whose employer was acquired by another
brokerage firm and who declined a job offer with the new firm).
White v. Harvey, 979 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1999)
(affirming the trial court’s holding that a defendant’s insurer is
not entitled to deduct the amount of a subrogated claim from a
defendant’s offer of judgment).
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Ayele v. Unisea, Inc., 980 P.2d 955 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the Workers’ Compensation Board’s failure to
discuss lay witness testimony was not reversible error).
Irvine v. Glacier General Construction, 984 P.2d 1103 (Alaska
1999)
(holding that the Rehabilitation Benefits Administrator’s failure
to consider the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician was
harmless error).
Larsen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 993 P.2d 428 (Alaska 1999)
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(reversing the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and
remanding the case because the officers had timely challenged
their work assignments).
Belluomini v. Fred Meyer of Alaska, 993 P.2d 1009 (Alaska 1999)
(rejecting Belluomini’s claims that his employer had not acted in
good faith by not following sexual harassment policies in
terminating him, and holding that Belluomini had no cause of
action for interference with a constitutional right).
Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 977 P.2d 713 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment
against Wilson, a former firefighter who claimed he should have
had a preferential right to rehire to his previous position when
he returned to the fire department).
FAMILY LAW
Tollefsen v. Tollefsen, 981 P.2d 568 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the superior court erred in awarding the
economically disadvantaged spouse the smaller share of the
marital assets).
Nicholson v. Wolfe, 974 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1999)
(remanding the case to the trial court for a determination of the
parties’ intentions regarding the division of marital and business
assets ).
Benson v. Benson, 977 P.2d 88 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the trial court did not retroactively modify child
support arrearages when it calculated past due support in the
absence of a support order for the relevant time period).
Berry v. Berry, 978 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in a
divorce action by not crediting the wife for mortgage and home
repair payments, because a credit for post-separation payments
was not required).
Berg v. Berg, 983 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the trial court did not commit legal error when it
used a 1996 appraisal instead of a 1997 appraisal for land
valuation purposes).
Lacher v. Lacher, 993 P.2d 413 (Alaska 1999)
(holding that the trial court erred in its determination and
division of marital assets and its calculation of child support).
